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ABSTRACT
It is well known that distributed denial of service attacks are a major threat to 
the Internet today. Surveys of network operators repeatedly show that the Inter-
net’s stakeholders are concerned, and the reasons for this are clear: the frequency, 
magnitude, and complexity of attacks are growing, and show no signs of slow-
ing down. With the emergence of the Internet of Things, fifth-generation mobile 
networks, and IPv6, the Internet may soon be exposed to a new generation of so-
phisticated and powerful DDoS attacks.
But how did we get here? In one view, the potency of DDoS attacks is owed to 
a set of underlying architectural issues at the heart of the Internet. Guiding prin-
ciples such as simplicity, openness, and autonomy have driven the Internet to be 
tremendously successful, but have the side effects of making it difficult to verify 
source addresses, classify unwanted packets, and forge cooperation between net-
works to stop traffic. These architectural issues make mitigating DDoS attacks a 
costly, uphill battle for victims, who have been left without an adequate defense.
Such a circumstance requires a solution that is aware of, and addresses, the ar-
chitectural issues at play. Fueled by over 20 years worth of lessons learned from 
the industry and academic literature, Gatekeeper is a mitigation system that neu-
vii
tralizes the issues that make DDoS attacks so powerful. It does so by enforcing
a connection-oriented network layer and by leveraging a global distribution of
upstream vantage points. Gatekeeper further distinguishes itself from previous
solutions because it circumvents the necessity of mutual deployment between net-
works, allowing deployers to reap the full benefits alone and on day one.
Gatekeeper is an open-source, production-quality DDoS mitigation system. It
is modular, scalable, and built using the latest advances in packet processing tech-
niques. It implements the operational features required by today’s network ad-
ministrators, including support for bonded network devices, VLAN tagging, and
control plane tools, and has been chosen for deployment by multiple networks.
However, an effective Gatekeeper deployment can only be achieved by writing
and enforcing fine-grained and accurate network policies. While the basic function
of such policies is to simply govern the sending ability of clients, Gatekeeper is ca-
pable of much more: multiple bandwidth limits, punishing flows for misbehavior,
attack detection via machine learning, and the flexibility to support new protocols.
Therefore, we provide a view into the richness and power of Gatekeeper policies
in the form of a policy toolkit for network operators.
Finally, we must look to the future, and prepare for a potential next generation
of powerful and costly DDoS attacks to grace our infrastructure. In particular, link
flooding attacks such as Crossfire (Kang et al., 2013) use massive, distributed sets
of bots with low-rate, legitimate-looking traffic to attack upstream links outside of
the victim’s control. A new generation of these attacks could soon be realized as
IoT devices, 5G networks, and IPv6 simultaneously enter the network landscape.
Gatekeeper is able to hinder the architectural advantages that fuel link flooding
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Denial of Service in the Past, Present, and Future
1.1 OVERVIEW
It is hard to overstate the impact that distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
continue to have on the Internet. It is one of the top concerns of network oper-
ators (Akamai, 2019; Menscher, 2020), and by the numbers, it is easy to see why.
Figure 1.1 shows the largest recorded attacks by volume for each year since 2002.
Aside from a noticeable outlier in 2019, the trend is quite clear: peak attack magni-
tude is growing exponentially. Additionally, attacks are becoming more frequent
and sophisticated, pushing mitigation systems to their breaking points and driving
up the cost to defend against attacks.
Figure 1.1: Approximate peak attack magnitude by year (Arbor Net-
works, 2014; NETSCOUT, 2019; Neustar, 2020; AWS, 2020b).
But perhaps an even clearer indication of the runaway nature of the problem
is that the effects of DDoS attacks have entered the consciousness of the general
public. The financial and social impacts of DDoS attacks are cited in high-profile
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incidents, including the DDoS attack used to disrupt communications between
protestors in Hong Kong (Marvin, 2019), as well as a 500% spike in DDoS attacks
during the COVID-19 pandemic, as millions are forced to work remotely via the
Internet (NexusGuard, 2020).
The economics of trying to defend against DDoS attacks is similarly grim. A
report by Arbor Networks indicated that the cost incurred to victims from a ma-
jor DDoS attack was over $220K (NETSCOUT, 2019). In contrast, attackers can
easily launch a 125 Gbps DDoS attack for only several dollars (Makrushin, 2017).
Additionally, the average cost of launching a DDoS attack will likely continue to
fall through 2023, since the attack surfaces and resources leveraged by attackers
are growing fast: the average broadband speed is more than doubling, and the
number of IoT devices is growing nearly 2.4-fold (Cisco, 2020).
How have DDoS attacks become so damaging? Part of the issue is that there
are certain architectural underpinnings of the Internet that enable DDoS attacks
to be not just possible, but also potent. Both the academic networking commu-
nity and the industry have implemented solutions to combat these problems, and
although much progress has been made in identifying the salient issues and apply-
ing a patchwork of fixes, few have adequately addressed the holistic architectural
advantage that attackers enjoy, and none have seen actual deployment. A solu-
tion is needed that both (1) addresses the architectural issues that fuel the ability
of DDoS attacks to thrive in the Internet, and (2) that is able to be deployed with
full benefits to drive adoption.
However, before we talk about a solution, in this chapter we will retrace our
steps and think about DDoS attacks of the past, present, and future. To begin, we
will define the threat model and goals of a DDoS mitigation system, and provide
3
a short tour of the relevant work in the commercial and academic arenas that have
attempted to solve DDoS attacks. Next, we will explain the architectural properties
of the Internet that have helped DDoS attackers to flourish. We then demonstrate
the possibility for circumstances to worsen in the near future, and propose that
Gatekeeper, a DDoS mitigation system, addresses the salient architectural issues,
and can achieve the escape velocity needed to actually deploy elegant techniques




There have been many attempts at mitigating DDoS attacks, mostly split along
two lines: commercial solutions and academic solutions. Both sides have made
contributions to the state of the art in defensive systems, but there has been lit-
tle cross-pollination between them, and there remains a large gap in the solution
space. Elegant as they are, academic solutions have not been able to be deployed
into the network due to the financial and technical barriers to making significant
changes to the Internet architecture, which is often required for effective solutions.
On the other side, the DDoS defense market is a lucrative industry, but the space of
available products is quite limited and expensive, and the purveyors of these ser-
vices are mostly only those who can use their distributed, Internet-scale infrastruc-
ture and services to absorb attacks (Nygren et al., 2010; Akamai, 2020; Cloudflare,
2020a; Imperva, 2020).
To dig deeper into the space of mitigation techniques, we will first define the
threat model that mitigation systems are up against. Then, we highlight some
solutions in both the commercial and academic arenas. Finally, we explain why
there is still a need from the networking community for a cheap, comprehensive,
and deployable defense for DDoS attacks.
1.2.1 Threat Model and Goals
Threat model. For this thesis, we define the threat model as follows:
• Assumption 1. Attack locus. We assume that attackers launch infrastructure-
layer attacks, which are attacks that target the network and transport (L3 and
L4) layers and infrastructure to deny access to legitimate clients by over-
whelming the network bandwidth and processing capacity of victims. For
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example: UDP fragment floods, DNS and NTP amplification attacks, TCP
SYN floods, etc. Note that some infrastructure layer attacks, such as am-
plification attacks (Paxson, 2001; Czyz et al., 2014b; Rossow, 2014), use ap-
plication layer vulnerabilities to trigger volumetric responses that ultimately
overwhelm the infrastructure layer. As of 2017, infrastructure-layer attacks
make up more than 99% of all DDoS traffic (Akamai, 2017). The remaining
1% consists of non-infrastructure, “low and slow” attacks, including:, but not
limited to: (1) those that target applications or application data, such as HTTP
GET, PUSH, and POST attacks; (2) Reduction of Quality (RoQ) attacks (Guirguis
et al., 2004), which do not target the availability of victims, but rather orches-
trate low-intensity requests that target system dynamics to destabilize the
system and reduce service quality. Although some of the methods presented
in this thesis may be applicable to these other non-infrastructure attacks, we
do not explicitly address them.
• Assumption 2. Attack type. We assume that there is a set of infrastructure-
layer attack types that is well-known to both the attacker and the mitigation
system. Although this may give the mitigation system hints about the pres-
ence of an attack, the mitigation system does not know the exact parameters
of these attacks, and cannot decide with absolute certainty whether a given
flow is participating in such an attack. Additionally, we assume that there
are novel infrastructure-layer attack types that the mitigation system does
not know about a priori, but that this can be typified.
• Assumption 3. Attack resources. We assume that attackers have a fixed pool of
resources (e.g., bots), and use those resources to launch attacks that are strong
enough to achieve denial of service to legitimate clients, but no stronger. At-
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tackers spread out their resources, such as per-bot attack rate, as much as
possible to avoid detection.
• Assumption 4. Attack source. We assume that devices participating in an
attack are out of the administrative control of the mitigation system, and
that attackers (and their associated bots) hide their identities and try to place
blame for attack traffic on unwitting, innocent clients by using source address
spoofing.
A note on terminology: we will use the term distributed denial of service attack,
since in the current Internet ecosystem of readily-available clouds and botnets,
massively distributed attacks have become the norm. However, the principles out-
lined in this thesis are also applicable to non-distributed (“just” DoS) attacks.
Goals of mitigation. The basic goal of a DDoS defense system is to mitigate
attacks, or sufficiently reduce the amount of attack traffic in the network to allow
legitimate traffic access to services. To this end, the most effective DDoS mitigation
system will:
• Goal 1. Minimize the amount of (wasted) bandwidth, memory, and CPU
used in the hosts, routers, and other devices along the path from the attacker
to the target.
• Goal 2. Minimize the time from attack onset to attack mitigation.
• Goal 3. Maximize the proportion of attack traffic that is mitigated.
• Goal 4. Minimize the amount of collateral damage, i.e., the amount of legiti-
mate traffic that is reduced as a consequence of the system.
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Note that these goals are not exhaustive, and it may not be possible to com-
pletely optimize (i.e., to absolute maximum or minimum) these goals. Because of
Assumptions 2 and 4, which say that a mitigation system cannot perfectly decide
whether a flow is participating in an attack and that the mitigation system has no
authoritative control over the source, it is not feasible to mitigate 100% of attack
traffic without any wasted resources or collateral damage.
Now that we have an understanding of the threat model and goals of mitiga-
tion, we will provide a brief survey of commercial and academic mitigation solu-
tions.
1.2.2 Commercial Solutions
Commercially available DDoS mitigation solutions often provide redirection-based
architectures as a paid service to their customers. For example, in the clean-pipe ap-
proach, a customer’s traffic is redirected through a scrubbing center, which uses
various analytic tools to identify malicious traffic and remove it from the data
stream. The only traffic that reaches the customer’s infrastructure is therefore
“clean.” Similarly, networks can contract the services of content distribution net-
works (CDNs) to gain access to their distributed and high-capacity infrastructure
to dilute and absorb large attacks (Gilad et al., 2016).
Providers of DDoS mitigation services use these techniques and others, such as
machine learning for traffic profiling, to perform attack detection and absorption.
The exact services and options vary from provider to provider. Popular products in
this space include Akamai Prolexic (Akamai, 2020), Cloudflare’s DDoS protection
tools (Cloudflare, 2020a), and Imperva Incapsula (Imperva, 2020).
Customers shopping for DDoS protection services have to consider multiple
8
issues when choosing a provider. First, they have to decide what forms of DDoS
mitigation they are interested in, as some providers offer only application layer
protections, while others offer transport, SSL, and infrastructure defenses as well.
There can also be restrictions regarding how the customer can use the service; for
example, infrastructure protection from Imperva Incapsula can only be applied for
a single IP address or an entire C class (/24) network (Imperva, 2020). Addition-
ally, customers who host latency-sensitive applications must be aware of the ef-
fects of the redirection through DDoS protection services on latency. Finally, most
DDoS protection services use proprietary attack detection algorithms, giving the
customers little control over how to analyze and prioritize traffic (Liu et al., 2016).
Cost is also a major factor. Although exact pricing is largely not publicly avail-
able, most enterprise-level tiers of protection are expensive1. Even the “free” tiers
of DDoS protection that are often rolled into Web hosting or CDN services at no
extra charge can have hidden fees, or have no service guarantees (Arazi, 2020). To
help lower the financial burden, many providers offer on demand service alterna-
tives (as opposed to always on), but this carries the risk of allowing an attack to
succeed while the mitigation system is configured and the redirection mechanism
is activated. Unfortunately, foregoing DDoS protection in today’s Internet is not
an option; according to an industry survey, each DDoS attack can cost the victim
organization up to $50k (Corero, 2019).
1.2.3 Academic Solutions
Alongside commercial efforts, there has been a long trajectory of academic work
to thwart DDoS attacks. While the threat of DDoS was known to the academic
1We provide more details about the cost of commercial DDoS protection services in Sec-
tion 2.4.6.1.
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community in the 1990s, the February 2000 attack by MafiaBoy that famously took
down e-commerce sites such as Yahoo! and eBay (Moore et al., 2001) was a call-to-
arms for network operators and researchers. Since that point, the community has
taken a much broader interest in DDoS attacks and how to defend against them.
Denial of service is a multi-faceted problem. There is work in the realm of
(1) attack detection, or how to differentiate malicious attacks from network mis-
configurations, errors, and flash crowds, and to what extent such a differentiation
matters; (2) attack mitigation, or how to stop attacks from disrupting service to le-
gitimate users; and (3) attack accountability, or how to identify attackers and hold
them responsible, potentially with performance penalties or even legal action.
This thesis sits squarely in the realm of attack mitigation. There have been
many bodies of work in this field, including overlay-based architectures (Ander-
sen, 2003) and blackholing approaches (Giotsas et al., 2017), but we will briefly
highlight two of the largest swaths of academic work: network capabilities and
filters.
1.2.3.1 Network Capabilities
IPv4 and IPv6, the ubiquitous network layer protocols in the data plane, are con-
nectionless. Clients can transmit datagrams to servers without prior arrangement
or permission. This design decision was made in an effort to keep the network
layer communication open and simple, resulting in a best-effort service that has,
in many ways, withstood the test of time.
From the perspective of defending against infrastructure-layer DDoS attacks,
though, this is a vulnerability. Allowing network layer messages to reach the
server necessarily means that network layer access has been granted, in the sense
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Figure 1.2: Transmission scenarios without (top) and with (bottom)
network capabilities. Packets without capabilities are dropped at
routers.
that the bits of the packet are being received, consuming some of the bandwidth of
the server. Simple flooding attacks from small botnets can easily exhaust a server’s
network resources. This is the problem that network capabilities tries to solve (An-
derson et al., 2004). In a network capability system, clients must explicitly receive
an authorization token (a capability) to be able to send traffic. By default, some or
all of the routers and hosts on the path from a source to a destination drop packets
without a valid capability (Figure 1.2).
Essentially, network capabilities represent a connection-oriented network layer.
But how could such an architecture work? Anderson et al. (2004) proposed that be-
fore being able to transmit normal traffic, senders must first request capability to-
kens from Request-To-Send servers. Once they obtain the token, they have explicit
permission to send privileged traffic. Routers along the client-server path would
act as capability verification points for such privileged traffic. Although this work
provided the foundation for network capabilities, it was only a strawman design
and was, to our knowledge, never implemented.
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Other work then further developed capabilities as a new architectural tech-
nique. The Stateless Internet Flow Filter (SIFF) (Yaar et al., 2004) refined the net-
work capability design, including removing the requirement for per-flow state at
routers to validate capability tokens. The Traffic Validation Architecture (Yang
et al., 2005) further enriched the state of the art by providing the first implementa-
tion of a capability system and evaluating it against various types of attacks.
At this point, there still existed practical and theoretical issues with network
capabilities. On the practical side, there was still no workable solution for de-
ploying a network capability system, including the fact that capability verification
required upgrading routers along client-server paths. It seemed that the most re-
alistic scenario was for deploying networks to only deploy the verification at their
border routers, which still allowed attacks to consume resources up to the destina-
tion network. On the theoretical side, there was no feasible solution for protecting
the capability setup (or capability request) channel. The request channel is a cru-
cial part of the network capability architecture, since it represents the gateway for
senders to able to obtain permission to transmit data, but is vulnerable to floods of
requests from attackers that drown out legitimate requests. In fact, this flaw in the
design of network capabilities became such a weakness that it threatened to derail
the entire architecture.
Argyraki and Cheriton (Argyraki & Cheriton, 2005a) pointed out that this vul-
nerability, which they named the denial of capabilities (DoC) problem, presented a
fundamental contradiction: if a mechanism existed to protect the capability setup
channel, then the same mechanism could be used to protect the privileged traffic
channel, therefore removing the need for capabilities in the first place. It was not
until two years later that the Portcullis work showed that in fact, capability setup
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traffic is different in nature than privileged traffic. Since only a single request
packet is needed to obtain a capability token, the mitigation system just needs
to provide a predictable and non-negligible probability that the sender’s request
packet reaches the receiver (Parno et al., 2007). By using computational puzzles to
force fair sharing of the request channel, Portcullis had solved the DoC problem.
Additionally, there are more recent examples of work in the space of network
capabilities. NetFence (Liu et al., 2010), allows receivers to use congestion polic-
ing feedback as capability tokens to suppress unwanted traffic, and also provides
a time-based mechanism for guaranteeing a predictable capability setup request
time, as opposed to the computational puzzles proposed by Portcullis. MiddlePo-
lice (Liu et al., 2016) marries the concepts of cloud-based DDoS protection services
with the destination-based control of network capability systems.
All in all, network capability systems would help mitigate DDoS attacks by
largely replacing the free ability of attackers to transmit data to a server with a
permission-based, connection-oriented network layer. However, none of the capa-
bility systems from the literature have been deployed, mostly due to the fact that
there are few benefits to only a single network deploying these solutions (i.e., they
all offer only incremental deployment benefits).
1.2.3.2 Filters
The filtering approach to DDoS mitigation is more in-line with the general prin-
ciples of a connectionless network layer. By allowing traffic to be freely transmit-
ted by default and only taking mitigating actions when issues are detected, filters
represent an optimistic approach to DDoS defense, and are the dual to network
capability systems.
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The basic mechanism at play is a firewall: a set of filtering rules placed at one or
more routers along the path from the clients to the target server (Figure 1.3). Each
rule is typically specified in a declarative language that matches one or more fea-
tures of a packet, and either software or hardware can apply the rules to received
packets. Filters can drop or rate limit packets as the rule specifies. Challenges of
filter systems include the fact that there is no single authority to trust when mak-
ing filtering decisions upstream, the lack of source address verification to verify
where filters should be placed, and state management issues for filters installed
throughout the network.
In practice, firewalls and filters have been a part of production network soft-
ware since at least the mid-1990s. For example, the Linux administrative utility
for packet filtering, iptables, is capable of matching against any or all parts of an
IP packet’s five-tuple (protocol, source IP, destination IP, source port, destination
port), along with other header fields as well as stateful filtering. iptables can be
used to mitigate many network security events including some DDoS attacks, but
it is insufficient to combat the scale and sophistication of attacks today, since fil-
ters are most effective when they are installed as close to the source of the attack
as possible. Consider the bandwidth used by attack traffic at each hop between
a malicious client and the target. The bandwidth used at each hop is bandwidth
wasted, and the cycles used by routers on this path to process attack traffic is also
wasted.
This is where the academic approach to network filters saw traction during the
mid-to-late 2000s. How can filters be used as far upstream as possible to catch and
stop as much traffic as possible? Pushback (Mahajan et al., 2002) was among the
earliest efforts to capture the main challenges of filters, with a strawman design to
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Figure 1.3: Transmission scenarios before (top) and after (bottom)
filters are applied.
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fingerprint traffic and apply filters. Filters can be applied both at the local router
and up the path to the source by pushing back rules closer to the attack source. Argy-
raki & Cheriton (2005b) provided the Active Internet Traffic Filtering framework,
which limits the amount of filtering state used in upstream routers by identifying
the router closest to the attacking source that is willing to cooperate with filtering
requests. Neither of these first two filtering proposals provided full implemen-
tations, and therefore were not deployed. Liu et al. (2008) contributed StopIt, a
hardened filtering architecture that improved on previous work by adding mech-
anisms to resist (1) filter exhaustion attacks and (2) bandwidth flooding attacks
that prevent the installation of filters. It also provided the first implementation (as
opposed to simulation) of a filtering system, and offered a systematic comparison
between filters and network capabilities. However, due to its only incremental de-
ployment benefits, as well as its requirement for border routers to be upgraded to
perform source authentication, StopIt was never deployed.
There are also recent proposals to collaborate with source networks to perform
mitigating maneuvers with mechanisms other than filters, such as using rerout-
ing techniques (Lee et al., 2013). However, since collaborative techniques require
source networks to be incentivized to participate, which so far has not been shown
to be feasible in the current Internet, there are high deployment hurdles for filter-
ing architectures and none have been deployed in the wild.
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1.3 ARCHITECTURAL UNDERPINNINGS
We now discuss the architectural underpinnings that not only enable infrastructure
layer DDoS attacks to take place, but have also allowed them to flourish and evade
mitigation for decades. First, a note on what we mean by the Internet architecture.
Definition. The Internet architecture is all of the complementary network layer
protocols, infrastructure, and principles that make network interconnection possi-
ble:
• Protocols: data plane protocols such as IPv4 and IPv6 and their associated
addressing schemes; control plane protocols such as IS-IS, BGP, RIP, etc.
• Infrastructure: the interconnected structure of hosts and routers which exist
in access networks, transit networks, content delivery networks, points of
presence (PoPs), peering links and Internet exchange points (IXPs), etc.
• Principles: the open Internet, a decentralized network of networks, the best-
effort network-layer delivery service, the end-to-end principle, etc.
DDoS is an inherently architectural problem. To show this, we will describe
four architectural issues that enable DDoS attacks, and explain why DDoS mitiga-
tion systems should address these issues to be most effective, referencing the goals
defined in Section 1.2.1. While it may not be necessary to address all of the issues,
each issue that is left unresolved limits the effectiveness of a mitigation system.
Architectural Issue 1. Victim networks have little or no recourse with source net-
works. Due to the decentralized design of the Internet – a network of autonomous
systems (AS) with no central authority – there is no built-in mechanism for forg-
ing cooperation between networks to request attack mitigation from the source
network.
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The effect of Issue 1 is that it bounds the ability of a DDoS mitigation system to
minimize the amount of wasted resources on the attacker-target path (Goal 1). To
prevent the loss of network, memory, and CPU resources along the path, attacks
should be mitigated as close to the source as possible. At present, the best way of
doing this is with inter-AS cooperation between the victim and source networks.
Architectural Issue 2. There is no mechanism to stop unwanted traffic. Due to
the open and connectionless properties of the network layer, traffic is by default
permitted to transit the Internet and reach the destination network. Note that this
issue is about the mechanism to stop traffic, which is distinct from Issue 1, which
is about having the authority to stop traffic where it is most useful.
The effect of Issue 2 is that it guarantees that at least some attack traffic can
reach a targeted server before mitigating maneuvers can take place, so any attack
can be at least partially successful. This bounds the ability of a DDoS mitigation
system to minimize the time to attack mitigation (Goal 2), and similar to Issue 1,
limits its ability to minimize the amount of wasted resources (Goal 1).
Architectural Issue 3. Sender identity cannot be verified. Due to the lack of source
address verification in the architecture, even if unwanted traffic could be stopped
and mitigating maneuvers could be installed close to the source (Issues 1 and 2),
there is no mechanism at the network layer to guarantee the identity of the sender
of the traffic. Therefore, there is no guarantee that a mitigating maneuver itself
would not be denying service to an unwitting legitimate client.
The effect of Issue 3 is that it interferes with the mitigation system’s ability
to accurately differentiate between attackers and legitimate clients, bounding its
ability to maximize the proportion of attack traffic that is mitigated (Goal 3) and to
minimize the amount of collateral damage in terms of legitimate clients (Goal 4).
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Architectural Issue 4. A victim network cannot compete with the capacity of Internet-
scale attacks. The Internet is a massive network of networks with billions of con-
nected devices. Therefore, the capacity of a DDoS mitigation system in a singular
victim network will almost always be exponentially smaller than the capacity of
an Internet-scale botnet. Indeed, we know from analysis of the Mirai attack that it
is possible to press devices into botnet service at the scale of the Internet (Anton-
akakis et al., 2017). The aggregate bandwidth consumed by a massive number of
low-intensity, legitimate-looking attacking flows at the scale of even a fraction of
the Internet will very likely be greater than the capacity of a defensive system.
The effect of Issue 4 is that it inhibits the ability of DDoS mitigation systems to
reach all four defined goals. If the DDoS mitigation system itself is overwhelmed,
perhaps by either bandwidth exhaustion or state exhaustion, there is not much that
a system can do.
A solution to DDoS should be aware of these issues and address as many of
them as possible to be most effective. Ideally, the solution should also be instantly
and fully deployable, i.e., a deploying network should be able to reap the full ben-
efits of the system alone and on day one. Otherwise, as has been seen with the
great majority of DDoS mitigation proposals, systems that offer mere incremental
deployment benefits will likely never see the light of day.
19
1.4 THE NEXT GENERATION
Taking the status quo of DDoS attacks and defensive systems into context, we now
consider how the threat landscape may soon be shifting, yielding a new era of
damaging attacks. Very large DDoS attacks can be quite scary for network op-
erators, as during these events, operators must quickly perform triage to salvage
services amid an avalanche of attack data, and with each second that passes and
each flow that gets dropped, revenue is potentially lost.
Now, imagine the same event, but with a twist: no attack traffic reaches the
victim servers and services. In fact, no traffic is reaching the victim at all. Opera-
tors have no visibility into what attack is happening or how to start to mitigate it.
Imagine that such an attack could be achieved solely by using low-intensity traffic,
so that even if an operator could peek at the traffic, there is no way to differentiate
it from normal traffic. And imagine that the only way to stop such an attack would
be to collaborate manually (e.g., over the phone) with other operators.
These are the properties of large-scale link attacks, specifically the Crossfire
attack (Kang et al., 2013). Crossfire uses a massive and distributed botnet to or-
chestrate legitimate-looking flows to overwhelm a set of targeted links, upstream
of the victim network and outside of the control of its operators. Crossfire has
been described as “the most devastating and stealthy attack to date" (Gillani et al.,
2015), and it is easy to see why: the operator does not know for sure that the attack
is happening, there is no way to discern from where the attack is coming, and the
operator cannot stop it without out-of-band help.
Such attacks are feasible in the Internet today, and similar attacks have already
appeared in the wild (Bright, 2013). But now, there is a confluence of factors emerg-
ing in the Internet that could lead to a next generation of such large-scale link at-
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tacks. Consider the following advances in technology:
• The proliferation of the Internet of Things, bringing about a new generation of
“smart” Internet-connected devices.
• The rollout of fifth-generation (5G) cellular networks, giving mobile devices
greater network capacity than ever before.
• The migration of networks to IPv6, revealing new, incrementally deployed
infrastructure.
Client devices are becoming more plentiful and more powerful at the same time
that many networks are undergoing infrastructural change. Could such an envi-
ronment give rise to a new generation of stealthy and devastating attacks such as
Crossfire? In this thesis, we consider a potential solution to DDoS attacks, includ-
ing large scale link attacks: Gatekeeper.
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1.5 THESIS STATEMENT AND APPROACH
The central thesis of this dissertation is that Gatekeeper is a deployable mitigation
system that neutralizes the architectural issues that make DDoS attacks potent, in
both the Internet of today and tomorrow. In order to formulate this finding, we
answer the following questions as we proceed through the chapters:
1. What are the architectural issues at stake that make DDoS attacks possible
and potent? In this chapter, we described the architectural underpinnings
that have enabled DDoS attacks to grow to a top operational concern, while
decades of work in DDoS defense have yielded few deployable results. Even
worse is the fact that there exists a confluence of factors that might signifi-
cantly amplify the damage of DDoS attacks in the near future. Such architec-
tural issues need to be addressed in order for a DDoS mitigation system to
be effective.
2. What would such a DDoS mitigation system look like? In Chapter 2, we de-
scribe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a DDoS defense system,
Gatekeeper, which neutralizes the defined architectural issues. In addition,
Gatekeeper is open source and deployable by a single network, meaning that
unlike many DDoS solutions in the literature, it can see the light of day as a
real-world deployment.
3. How is such a DDoS mitigation system managed? In Chapter 3, we ex-
plore the mechanism that governs the mitigation system: destination poli-
cies. Such policies control who is permitted access to the protected network’s
services, and how they do so, and ranges in scope from the ability to perform
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simple lookups, to imposing punishments, supporting new protocols, and
utilizing machine learning techniques.
4. What is the outlook for the future? In Chapter 4, we look to tomorrow, and
theorize about whether Crossfire attacks are poised to take advantage of a
confluence of factors to unleash devastating DDoS attacks in the near future,
and what Gatekeeper can do in response.
To conclude, in Chapter 5, we discuss the ongoing deployments of Gatekeeper
and future research directions.
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1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS
Woven into the five chapters of this dissertation is a set of core contributions, in-
cluding:
• An interpretation of the features of the Internet architecture that allow DDoS
attacks to not just be possible, but to flourish
• The design of a fully deployable DDoS mitigation system, Gatekeeper, that
leverages historical work in DDoS defense, and neutralizes the aforemen-
tioned architectural issues at play
• An open source implementation of Gatekeeper, built with performance and
operational considerations in mind
• An evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of Gatekeeper, as well as an
analysis of the cost of Gatekeeper compared to other mitigation systems
• A network operator toolkit for writing rich and expressive destination poli-
cies in Gatekeeper
• An analysis of the potential for a next generation of massive link attacks due
to the confluence of IoT, 5G, and IPv6 entering the network landscape
• Open source implementations of the link map construction and target link
selection algorithm described in Kang et al. (2013)
• A prescription for how Gatekeeper can respond to such next-generation at-






This chapter presents Gatekeeper, a DDoS mitigation system that (1) is fully de-
ployable1 and (2) addresses the network-architectural issues at play, incorporating
many of the lessons learned by decades of DDoS mitigation research. Together,
these properties enable Gatekeeper to bridge the gap between the research com-
munity and the real world DDoS protection market, and provide an avenue for
a comprehensive DDoS mitigation system to be put into practice by a range of
deployers, balancing cost with scalability.
2.1.1 Components
At its heart, Gatekeeper is a network capability system (Section 1.2.3.1). Previous
proposals for capability-based systems failed to be deployed because in order to be
successful, the deploying AS needed to control both ends of the path (in order to do
capability management) or have trust arrangements with source networks. Gate-
keeper circumvents these issues by leveraging geographically-distributed vantage
points (VPs).
Between the VPs and the destination network, Gatekeeper provides a network-
layer connection mechanism, which requires an authoritative entity in the desti-
nation network to explicitly grant access to client traffic before it can reach the
intended destination server. This permission, or capability, takes the form of a
special value in the IP header of packets sent along the path from the VP to the
1Such that the deploying entity can reap the full benefits of the system alone and on day one.
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destination server.
Figure 2.1 depicts the general topology and highlights the two main compo-
nents of Gatekeeper: Gatekeeper servers located in each contracted vantage point,
and a Grantor server located in the data center of the defended AS. For simplicity,
we assume that the AS deploys all its services in a single data center.
Figure 2.1: Components of the Gatekeeper architecture.
Each time a client tries to send traffic to a server in the destination network, the
client’s traffic gets forwarded to the closest VP. There, the VP performs network
capability admission control. If a capability decision for the flow has not already
been made, the first packet of a flow is marked as a request and is forwarded to
the Grantor server, which will decide to either grant or decline the flow based on a
defined policy. If the flow has already been previously granted, then rate-limiting
state is updated, and if the flow has enough credits then the packet is sent along
26
the path to the destination AS, where it is decapsulated by Grantor and sent to the
ultimate destination.
In other words, at a high level, Grantor provides the ability to perform central-
ized policy decisions, and Gatekeeper provides the upstream policy enforcement.
Both ends of the this process – decision and enforcement – can be performed using
programs instead of static, declarative rules.
2.1.2 Step-By-Step Example
To demonstrate how the components of Gatekeeper work together, we now de-
scribe an end-to-end example of a client initiating a TCP connection. Since Gate-
keeper supports TCP/IP clients without modification, the client first sends a TCP
SYN as normal. The SYN packet is forwarded to the closest VP, since all contracted
VPs announce routes to the destination AS. Once received by the VP, the packet is
transferred to the router of the destination AS, which in turn hands the packet to
one of the Gatekeeper servers.
The Gatekeeper server checks whether there is state associated with the flow of
the packet, and if there is, decides what to do based on that state. In Gatekeeper,
flows are defined as the pair (source IP, destination IP).
In this example, we assume there is no state associated with the flow. In other
words, a capability decision has not yet been made. The Gatekeeper server first
allocates flow state that contains the arrival time of the SYN packet. Then, Gate-
keeper encapsulates the packet using the IP-in-IP protocol, and fills the new IP
header as follows: (a) the source IP address is the IP address of the server, (b) the
destination IP address is the address of a Grantor server, and (c) the DSCP field is a
value in the range 3−63 as determined by a priority assignment algorithm. Higher
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priority requests receive preferential service along the Gatekeeper to Grantor path
during attacks.
The encapsulated SYN packet is then forwarded to the destination AS using
a previously established tunnel. At the destination, the packet is delivered to the
Grantor server, which then decides whether to accept the packet based on a policy
defined by the deploying AS.
If the decision is to reject the connection, the Grantor server could do nothing,
or send its decision back to the Gatekeeper server to avoid another query for a
given period of time. If the decision is to accept, Grantor sends its decision back to
the Gatekeeper server, which includes the maximum rate at which the sender can
transmit (e.g., 1 Mbps) and a time limit for how long the decision is valid. Grantor
then transmits the SYN packet to the target server.
After processing the SYN packet, the destination server replies with a SYN
ACK that is sent directly to the source. The decision of the Grantor server arrives
at the Gatekeeper server and the SYN ACK packet arrives at the source. The source
will continue to send packets through the Gatekeeper server to the destination as
the Gatekeeper server enforces the assigned rate.
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2.2 DESIGN
We now present further details with regards to the four main components of Gate-
keeper: vantage points, Gatekeeper servers, Grantor servers, and the request chan-
nel.
2.2.1 Vantage Points
Vantage points are a central piece of Gatekeeper’s design. The term vantage point is
commonly used in the network tomography community to refer to strategic points
of the network from which to conduct measurements, or from which especially
rich, diverse, or representative measurements can be made. However, in Gate-
keeper, vantage points (VPs) are strategic locations in the network where a Gate-
keeper server deployment is hosted. Common examples are Internet exchange
points (IXPs), cloud data centers, and carrier hotels that host private interconnec-
tions. In this work, we will mostly use IXPs as exemplars for VPs, since the struc-
ture and characteristics of IXPs are well-documented due to their more public and
transparent nature compared to clouds and private interconnects. Still, all such en-
tities are considered vantages because they offer four benefits for DDoS mitigation
systems, which are described next.
2.2.1.1 Benefits of VPs
First, VPs are often well-provisioned. For example, the switching fabric of clouds
and IXPs are typically highly-redundant and composed of multiple aggregation
levels across distributed colocation sites (Chatzis et al., 2013). This provides for
high levels of resiliency and bisection bandwidth; some IXPs are already capable
of processing traffic at peak speeds of more than 10 Tbps (IX.br, 2020). High peak
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capacity is key to being able to mitigate tail DDoS attacks while minimizing collat-
eral damage to clients.
The second advantage is that VPs are often available topologically close to
source networks. According to various measurement studies (Gill et al., 2008;
Dhamdhere & Dovrolis, 2010), the topology of the Internet is flattening, meaning
that the Internet is shifting away from hierarchical routing through tiers of ISPs
and transit providers and toward a mesh-like routing structure due to peering
agreements between networks. Cloud providers participate too: Microsoft and
Amazon peer at IXPs (AWS, 2020d; Yeganeh et al., 2019). Although transit net-
works still play a key role for reachability, the effect of this flattening is that VPs
can act as insertion points for DDoS mitigation much closer to the source network
than if hierarchical routing through transit providers was used. This is key to be-
ing able to fulfill the goal of minimizing the amount of wasted resources along an
attacker’s path to the target.
Third, VPs are globally distributed. By recent counts, there are over 800 IXPs
distributed across over 130 countries in every continent except Antarctica (Peer-
ingDB, 2020; Packet Clearing House, 2020). On the cloud side, Amazon’s data cen-
ters are distributed across more than 20 geographically distinct regions, with 220
points of presence (PoPs) that span more than 40 countries across all continents ex-
cept Antarctica AWS (2020c). The global distribution of VPs is key to Gatekeeper
being able to handle Internet-scale attacks.
The fourth advantage is that leveraging existing infrastructure reduces the cap-
ital expenses for network operators, lowering the barrier to deploy services. Data
centers in clouds and IXPs typically pay the rent and provide the power, cooling,
and basic network connectivity for members. Participants just need to bring a
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router to peer along with whatever network gear, compute, and storage is needed.
Although members are charged fees for their participation, these much smaller
operating expenses pale in comparison to the investment that would otherwise be
needed to deploy vantage points in private facilities.
2.2.1.2 Placement of VPs
A key issue in designing a distributed Gatekeeper deployment is how to select
the set of VPs across the Internet wherein Gatekeeper is deployed. Although the
formulation and solution to such a deployment problem is outside the scope of
this thesis, we will provide some preliminary thoughts about how to address it.
The VP selection problem is similar to the cache deployment optimization prob-
lem (Hasan et al., 2014), an offline economic and planning problem across rela-
tively long (months or years) time scales, where CDN operators choose the set of
networks in which to deploy CDN caches. This is in contrast to the older cache
location problem (Krishnan et al., 2000), which focuses the cache placement issue
from the perspective of a single network. The main constraints and trade-offs for
such a problem are deployment cost for the CDN, balanced against the perfor-
mance requirements of end-users. The VP selection problem is concerned with the
following properties.
Multiple time scales. Similar to cache deployment optimization, the VP selec-
tion problem is long-term planning issue, since deploying network hardware to a
VP requires investment and permanent maintenance. However, the elasticity of
the cloud enables semi-permanent VP deployments that could be bootstrapped as
a response to an attack or for other short time scales.
From-scratch vs. iterative. The VP selection problem is relevant for both first-
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time and existing Gatekeeper deployers. Constructing an initial set of deploying
VPs would be useful for first-time deployers, whereas an iterative version of the
solution to calculate the marginal benefit of adding VP n + 1 would be beneficial
for existing deployers.
Cost. An important input to the VP selection problem is the cost that a deployer
would pay for a deployment in a given VP with a given level of resources. If cost
were no objective, then the naive solution would be to simply deploy Gatekeeper
at all candidate VPs. However, for each VP that is selected, the operator must pay
for network gear (switches and servers), participation fees, and maintenance in
the case of IXPs, and virtual compute, storage, and bandwidth charges in the case
of clouds. Network operators are therefore interested in minimizing the manage-
ment and operational costs that scale with the number of VPs, while maximizing
the aggregate capacity of Gatekeeper, and also maximizing the spread of potential
end-users (read: potential attackers) across VPs.
End-user and traffic spread. Typical metrics for cache placement problems are
concerned with minimizing the total amount of traffic in the system and minimiz-
ing the delay experienced by end-users. For VP selection, end-user delay is a con-
cern, but the main metric should be related to the potential peak traffic capacity, in
hopes of spreading the potential amount of users and traffic to VPs proportionally
based on their capacity. A traffic throughput history for each candidate VP would
be a desirable input, but a proxy metric could be the number of IP addresses in the
networks that would be anycast-served by the candidate VP. This could approxi-
mate the number of connected devices that would be served by the VP, but because
of private address spaces and NAT, could also considerably undercount the actual
figure. Ideally, the metric should also capture the potential attack traffic that is di-
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rected through the VP, for which databases that describe network reputation could
be used.
2.2.1.3 Requirements of VPs
In general, VPs have four requirements for basic operation: (1) computing capacity,
(2) cheap ingress bandwidth, (3) BGP peering, and (4) private links to the protected
network.
Computing capacity. A VP must be an insertion point for mitigation software
to run. Nodes without general computing capacity, such as dedicated routers or
other middleboxes, are insufficient to run Gatekeeper.
Cheap ingress bandwidth. A VP must support a pricing model where ingress
bandwidth is either free or cheap. For example, implicit in the peering model of
private interconnects and IXPs is that traffic is exchanged between participants for
free. Similarly, many cloud providers use a pricing model where ingress traffic
is free and users are charged for egress traffic only. This requirement is in place
because of the nature of a DDoS mitigation system – in order to protect legitimate
traffic at all times, the system is always on, so at a minimum legitimate traffic
is always passing through the system. Charging for this traffic would be costly
and impractical. At peak, during attacks, charging for ingress traffic would give
attackers a direct lever on the price that victim networks pay.
BGP peering. VPs must support the ability to redirect traffic ultimately des-
tined for the protected network through the vantage point first. In the current
Internet, this is achieved through eBGP prefix announcements. Instead of an-
nouncing routes to a protected network’s prefixes at traditional border routers,
Gatekeeper servers announce the prefixes that they are configured to protect. In a
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global deployment, this creates an anycast network, where client traffic is always
forwarded to the nearest VP instead of directly to the protected network. Note that
some network locations that would otherwise be good candidates for a VP, such as
some cloud providers, do not allow customers to partipcate in BGP sessions, and
therefore cannot be VPs.
Private links. VPs must be connected to the protected network by a private
path that does not expose routable addresses to the open Internet. Otherwise,
routers along the path would be susceptible to DDoS attacks themselves. To get
the most protection along the path, physical links could be used (e.g., dark fiber),
but that may be prohibitively expensive for some deployers. Instead, virtual links
via tunneling (e.g., MPLS) using shared infrastructure would also be sufficient.
However, using shared infrastructure raises the possibility of attacks on the links
and routers on the path, even if the deployer’s share of the resources is not directly
reachable.
2.2.1.4 Relationship to Edge Computing
From a high level, Gatekeeper vantage points are in the domain of edge computing,
a distributed computing paradigm in which the compute and storage power of the
network edge is leveraged to mainly reduce application response time, but also to
provide better scalability and reliability as well as offload computation from user
devices when necessary (Satyanarayanan, 2017). There are two main ways of inter-
preting the “edge.” One is as a separate, logical layer between access networks and
the cloud, composed of one-hop-away devices such as fog computing nodes (e.g.,
routers and switches), mobile edge nodes (e.g., base stations), or cloudlets (ded-
icated “data centers in a box”) (Bonomi et al., 2012; Satyanarayanan, 2017). The
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second definition refers to distributed infrastructure further than one hop away,
such as PoPs, IXPs, and private data centers where content caching, authentica-
tion, TCP termination, load balancing, DDoS mitigation, and other services can
be inserted (Yap et al., 2017; Majkowski, 2017; Shirokov & Dasineni, 2018; Wragg,
2020). Gatekeeper fits squarely into this second definition, and is, to our knowl-
edge, the first open source DDoS mitigation software for the edge.
Vantage points provide the infrastructure for Gatekeeper to effectively address
the architectural barriers to combating DDoS. Next, we explore what role Gate-
keeper servers play in that process.
2.2.2 Gatekeeper Servers
Gatekeeper servers are the main components deployed in VPs, and have the data
plane responsibilities of (1) bookkeeping flow state and policy decisions, (2) en-
forcing policy decisions over flows, and (3) encapsulating traffic to be sent to the
destination (protected) network.
2.2.2.1 Flow State and Processing
When traffic is redirected through the VP as a consequence of BGP announce-
ments, ingress flows are load balanced between a set of one or more Gatekeeper
servers located in the VP. Since Gatekeeper handles any IPv4 or IPv6 traffic, flows
are defined as the (Source IP, Destination IP) pair, as opposed to common flow
definitions that also include TCP or UDP port numbers. Gatekeeper maintains
a flow table that maps incoming flows to flow entries, which can be one of four
types:
1. Request. No policy decision for the flow has yet been made by Grantor, or a
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previous policy decision for the flow has expired.
2. Granted. The flow is permitted to send traffic, and Gatekeeper will forward
its traffic at a prescribed rate. Any packets from this flow beyond that rate
will be dropped.
3. Declined. The flow is not permitted to send traffic. All packets from this flow
will be dropped.
4. BPF. The flow is to be processed by a policy enforcement program installed
at Gatekeeper. The program itself is (extended) Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF)
bytecode, which will forward or drop packets according to the specifics of
the program.
If the flow does not have a corresponding entry in the table at all, a new entry
of type Request is added to the table for the flow, and the packet is forwarded as a
request to Grantor.
The original design of Gatekeeper only included the Request, Granted, and De-
clined flow states, which are sufficient for a network capabilities system. Later,
the BPF flow state was added, which adds greater flexibility for operators to in-
stall arbitrary policy enforcement programs written in BPF to decide whether and
how packets should be forwarded. For example, programs may use multiple band-
width limits for different types of traffic within the same flow, which is not possible
with the Granted state.
2.2.2.2 Flow Encapsulation and Channels
Request and granted packets are encapsulated so that they can be transmitted to
a Grantor server in the destination network. There are two reasons for the encap-
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Priority Value Traffic Type
0 Legacy
1 Granted
2 Granted, renewing capability
3-63 Request
Table 2.1: Gatekeeper priority assignment scheme.
sulation. For request packets, a policy decision first needs to be made by Grantor
before the original data packet is forwarded along to the destination server (or not,
if the decision is Declined). Second, the encapsulation forces granted packets to be
processed by Grantor, which allows a central point for measurement and enables
the network operator to build policies around a global view of traffic. Optionally,
the encapsulation of granted packets could be disabled, allowing for direct deliv-
ery of packets to their destinations, with the added benefit of reduced bandwidth
consumption due to the lack of space taken up by encapsulation.
Although both request and granted packets are encapsulated and sent along
the same path, they are processed in different logical channels according to a prior-
ity value assigned to each packet. Granted packets are high priority, and are given
a vast majority of the path’s available bandwidth, e.g., 95%. Request packets are
given only a small fraction (e.g., 5%) of the available bandwidth and are scheduled
using a special priority queue based on the packets’ assigned priorities. Requests
with higher priorities are serviced first. Further details about the request channel
are in Section 2.2.4.
In theory, the priority assignment scheme could be designed in a number of
ways, but in practice the inflexibility of the network layer forces us to work the
priority scheme into the IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. Both of these protocols support
a Differentiated Services (DS) field in the packet header that can accommodate a 6-
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bit value. With six bits to work with, Gatekeeper uses priority assignment scheme
shown in Table 2.1. Further details about how request priorities are assigned is
described in Section 2.2.4. Central to Gatekeeper’s design is the maintenance of
flow states.
2.2.2.3 Flow States
When Gatekeeper receives a policy decision for a flow from Grantor, it updates
the flow table entry. All policy decisions contain an expiration time as part of the
response. Before a Granted or BPF flow’s capability expires, Gatekeeper encapsu-
lates a packet from the granted flow with a priority value reserved for granted
flows whose capability is about to expire. This special priority value triggers a
capability renewal from Grantor, avoiding delays or dropped packets that could
happen as a result of a granted decision expiring and needing to be renewed from
scratch. Otherwise, on expiry of a flow decision, flows go back to the Request state.
A state transition diagram for flows in Gatekeeper is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: State transition diagram for flows in Gatekeeper.
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To summarize, the flow processing algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. For
simplicity, the assignment of priorities to encapsulated packets is not shown.
Algorithm 1: Gatekeeper flow processing loop.
while True do
pkt = rx_packet();
flow = (pkt.srcIP, pkt.dstIP);
flow_entry = flow_tbl_lookup(flow);
if flow_entry != NULL then
// Process flow according to flow state.
if flow_entry.type == Request then
tx_request_to_grantor(encapsulate(pkt));
else if flow_entry.type == Granted then




else if flow_entry.type == Declined then
drop_packet(pkt);
else if flow_entry.type == BPF then
send = flow_entry.enforcement_program(pkt);











To maintain its effectiveness in the face of Internet-scale attacks, the design of Gate-
keeper enables scaling along four axes:
1. Increasing the number of VPs. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of can-
didate locations for VPs across the globe. The more VPs a network utilizes,
the more spread out ingress traffic will be, potentially diluting attacks.
2. Increasing the number of Gatekeeper servers in a VP. Multiple Gatekeeper
instances can be deployed in a single VP with flows load balanced between
them, enabling horizontal scaling.
3. Increasing the number of network ports used by each Gatekeeper server.
Each Gatekeeper instance should be able to accommodate bonded network
devices, allowing the network capacity of a single server to be scaled up
without additional nodes.
4. Increasing the multithreading level of Gatekeeper servers. This allows Gate-
keeper to scale-up the software processing power without additional hard-
ware investment.
2.2.3 Grantor Servers
To complement Gatekeeper servers, Grantor servers are deployed in the protected
AS to make the policy decisions that are enforced in the VPs. The responsibilities
of Grantor servers include (1) decapsulating granted packets and sending them to
their ultimate destination, and (2) running a policy decision program on request
packets and informing Gatekeeper of such policy decisions. The details of the
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policy program and decision-making are discussed in Chapter 3. While these re-
sponsibilities may seem like mundane technical details, they actually reflect three
broader important roles that Grantor servers play.
2.2.3.1 Roles
Capability granting. Grantor is a trusted entity for capability granting and ad-
ministers the capabilities for all protected hosts. Alternatively, capability granting
could be performed by the individual destination servers themselves. However,
using a separate authority to grant capabilities allows destination servers to re-
main unmodified, which is key for deployment and different from many previous
network capability systems.
Centralized control. Grantor has centralized authority over the operation of
the data plane, making it architecturally similar in spirit to Software-Defined Net-
working (SDN) (Casado et al., 2007; Yap et al., 2017), especially in the context of
wide area networks (Yang et al., 2019). Using an SDN-like architecture simplifies
network management for Gatekeeper, since operators only need to configure one
(or a small set of) Grantor server(s) with the desired policy that is then enforced
at the vantage points. In this view, Grantor servers are analogous to SDN con-
trollers and Gatekeeper servers are analogous to SDN switches. Grantor servers
install policy decisions on Gatekeeper servers using a protocol that is analogous to
OpenFlow (McKeown et al., 2008). Additionally, the policy enforcement (BPF) pro-
grams that run at Gatekeeper servers are analogous to virtualized network func-
tions (Han et al., 2015), as well as P4 data plane programs that can be run on SDN
switches (Bosshart et al., 2014). The key difference between Gatekeeper and SDN
is that Gatekeeper is scoped more narrowly to the issues and needs of DDoS miti-
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gation, and therefore does not require the complexity and level of protocol support
of OpenFlow and SDN switches and controllers.
Global traffic view. Since all request and granted traffic (not declined traffic)
is sent through Grantor, it can act as a centralized location for measurement. This
allows network operators to iteratively improve their network policies based on a
global view of the traffic. If this service is not desired, Gatekeeper can optionally
transmit all granted traffic directly to the destination servers, skipping the Grantor.
2.2.3.2 Scalability
Similar to Gatekeeper servers, Grantor servers provide scalability in several ways.
Grantor servers can scale horizontally within a destination network, with flows
load balanced between them. Grantor servers also have the same network and
CPU scaling abilities as Gatekeeper servers, since they can bond network devices
and utilize multiprocessing and multithreading.
2.2.4 Request Channel
The last major component of the Gatekeeper architecture is the request channel.
The request channel is a key aspect of network capability systems, but is particu-
larly prone to attacks, as described in Section 1.2.3.1. To summarize, care should be
taken to ensure that the mechanism to request a capability token is not susceptible
to DDoS attacks itself.
Gatekeeper takes three steps to protect the request channel: (1) allocating only
a small fraction of the path’s available bandwidth to the request channel, (2) as-
signing priorities to requests based on the time between successive packets in the
same flow, and (3) dropping the lowest priority packets when the request channel
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is overwhelmed. We now present details about each of these properties.
2.2.4.1 Request Channel Bandwidth Allocation
Separating low-priority request traffic from the high-priority privileged traffic has
its origins in the earliest network capabilities proposals (Anderson et al., 2004). The
reason for bifurcation is simple: the entity that performs connection management
to protect destinations from unwanted traffic has no connection protection itself,
so it is always possible for attackers to flood the connection setup mechanism.
Gatekeeper combats this issue dividing the available capacity of the path from
Gatekeeper to the destination network as approximately 95% granted traffic and
5% request traffic.
2.2.4.2 Request Priority Assignment
As previewed in Section 2.2.2.2, request packets are assigned a priority between 3-
63, with higher priorities representing higher priority request traffic. The request
priority assignment scheme stems from the results found in Portcullis (Parno et al.,
2007). There, it is shown that a legitimate user (using Portcullis) can always suc-
cessfully transmit a request packet in time bounded by the amount of attacker
computation, since all clients must compute increasingly difficult proof-of-work
puzzles to obtain increasingly high priority for their traffic.
However, since Gatekeeper is designed to be deployed by a single AS and Gate-
keeper servers are therefore trusted entities, the priority assigned does not need to
be cryptographically secure as it does in Portcullis. Therefore, Gatekeeper sim-
plifies the proof-of-work mechanism to instead use waiting time as the metric to
determine the priority assigned to packets.
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The priority assigned to a request packet is log2(delta_time). Therefore, flows
that wait longer between successive packets are assigned higher priorities. This
mechanism encourages exponential backoff, and is similar to the legitimate sender
strategy outlined in Portcullis, in which legitimate senders will double the diffi-
culty of the puzzles that they solve for every failed attempt. However, this is still
not enough to mitigate the DoC problem: what if an attacker simply spams the
request channel with low priority requests?
2.2.4.3 Priority Queuing Scheme
To prevent attackers from simply overwhelming the request channel with low-
priority requests, nodes along the Gatekeeper-Grantor path (the Gatekeeper server
and routers) must drop low-priority packets when their queues are full. To this
end, Gatekeeper uses a priority queue that is implemented as a length-limited
linked list of requests, sorted by priority (Figure 2.3). Additionally, Gatekeeper
uses a constant-sized auxiliary array of references to the last (most recently added)
request of each priority in the list, as well as references to the front of the list and
back of the list. The priority queue supports the following operations, all of which
run in time O(1) relative to the size of the priority queue:
• Dequeue highest priority packet: the reference to the highest priority packet
represents the next packet to be serviced by the packet scheduler, so the de-
queuing operation simply removes the packet from the front of the queue. If
there are multiple packets of the same such priority, the packet that has been
in the queue the longest is scheduled.
• Enqueue new packet, with available room: if there is room available in the pri-
ority queue for another packet, then the packet’s priority is looked up in the
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priority reference table. If there are already packets of that priority in the
queue, then the new packet is inserted at the end of the chain of those pack-
ets. If there are no packets of the priority in the queue, then the priority
references are scanned to find the next lowest priority that is present in the
queue. The new packet is then inserted after all packets of that next lowest
priority.
• Enqueue new packet, without available room: if the queue is full, then the priority
of the new packet is compared to the priority of the lowest packet in the
queue. The packet with the lower priority between the two is dropped. If
they have the same priority, the new packet is dropped.
Figure 2.3: Request channel priority queue.
The three properties above – (1) limiting request channel bandwidth, (2) assign-
ing request priorities based on waiting time, and (3) scheduling according to the
priority queue scheme – are sufficient to guarantee the successful operation of the
request channel according to the theorems proved by Portcullis. In particular, if a
network policy cannot identify attackers, then a legitimate sender will wait, in the
worst case, a time proportional to the number of attackers to have a policy decision
installed at the corresponding Gatekeeper server, and that this result is optimal.
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2.2.5 Vulnerabilities
In addition to the denial of capabilities problem, Gatekeeper must also be aware of
and address potential vulnerabilities against itself.
Packet priority integrity. If a man-in-the-middle attacker were able to compro-
mise a node on the path from the Gatekeeper server to the Grantor server, then
that attacker could change the bits of the DS field of the outer header of Gate-
keeper packets to change the priority from request to granted. This would allow
the attacker’s traffic to bypass some of the request channel throttling. However,
this attack is limited in its effectiveness, since the request channel algorithm is also
implemented at the Gatekeeper server, meaning that the 5% bandwidth limit and
priority queueing scheme will at least be enforced at that point. Moreover, the ef-
fectiveness of the attack is bounded by the number of routers in the remaining part
of the path after the priority is altered, since those are the only routers that would
be processing the packet as granted. Finally, this attack does not permanently affect
the state of the flow, which will remain in the request state, requiring the attacker
to alter every packet’s priority (and recompute every packet’s checksum) in order
to have an effect.
Spoofing policy decisions. A man-in-the-middle attacker could also compro-
mise packets going in the other direction, by changing policy decisions sent from
Grantor to Gatekeeper. Attackers are motivated to grant capabilities to their at-
tacking flows, and to do so at high rates, to avoid the mitigation of attack traffic
at Gatekeeper. This vulnerability can be solved by requiring digital signatures on
policy decision packets, which guarantees the integrity of the decision, and by re-
quiring signing entities (i.e., Grantor) to present a digital certificate, guaranteeing
the identity of the signer.
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State exhaustion. To calculate request packet priorities, Gatekeeper must keep
track of the inter-request time for each flow. This means that Gatekeeper will keep
per-flow state even during an attack, in which many packets with spoofed source
IP addresses may be crafted to try to overwhelm the Gatekeeper flow table with
many flow entries in the Request state. Gatekeeper handles this state exhaustion
attack against the flow table with horizontal scaling and multithreading, where
each thread in each Gatekeeper server is given a unique set of flows to be kept in its
own flow table, which is not shared between threads or servers. Gatekeeper is also
capable of using large flow tables, at least of size 225 for each thread (Section 2.4.5).
Also, old request entries are regularly pruned from the flow table, and even if
there is not enough room in the flow table to hold a request entry, the request is
still transmitted to Grantor to try to elicit a policy decision and at least allow the
flow to make progress, even if under the bandwidth limit of the request channel.
Attacks against a VP. Attackers may target the links or other resources of the
VP itself. VPs such as IXes and cloud data centers are generally well-provisioned
due to the amount of traffic that they serve on a typical basis, but a motivated at-
tacker with substantial resources could try to prevent packets from reaching Gate-
keeper at all. However, the impact of these attacks is limited in Gatekeeper deploy-
ments that leverage multiple VPs, since routes would eventually be announced to
direct traffic away from any affected VP. As a last resort, Gatekeeper can blackhole
traffic at a VP to geographically bound the impact.
2.2.6 Architectural Properties and Deployability
Recall that Section 1.3 describes how an ideal mitigation system will address at
least four core architectural issues to achieve a set of desirable goals for DDoS
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defense, and do so in a deployable way. The design of Gatekeeper addresses all of
these issues as follows:
Victim networks have little or no recourse with source networks. Communi-
cating across trust domains at the level of trying to convince other ASes to take mit-
igating actions is an extremely difficult problem to solve. Gatekeeper circumvents
this issue by using a geographic deployment that approximates the topological
position of source networks with VPs. Therefore, Gatekeeper foregoes the require-
ment to collaborate with other networks to stop DDoS attacks while still achieving
the goal of minimizing the amount of wasted resources on the attacker-target path.
There is no mechanism to stop unwanted traffic. By realizing a connection-
oriented network layer with capabilities, Gatekeeper provides the missing shutoff
mechanism to stop unwanted traffic. By being able to completely cut off any flow
from reaching the network, rate limiting questionable flows immediately, and re-
voking capabilities, Gatekeeper minimizes the time to mitigate attacks.
Sender identity cannot be verified. Gatekeeper does not provide sender iden-
tity verification per se. However, it does provide extra topological information by
virtue of the flow’s entry into the protected network at a particular VP. This infor-
mation can be used to detect flows with spoofed source addresses (Section 3.5.1.2).
Additionally, Gatekeeper can enforce certain lightweight authorization mechanisms
such as port knocking (Section 3.5.2). Policy techniques such as these allow Gate-
keeper to differentiate between attacking flows and legitimate flows, maximizes
the proportion of attack traffic that is mitigated and minimizes the amount of col-
lateral damage to legitimate clients.
A victim network cannot compete with the capacity of Internet-scale attacks.
Although Gatekeeper protects only a single network in current deployment mod-
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els, it can achieve an Internet-scale deployment through its usage of distributed
vantage points. It is still true that with enough money and bots, an attacker can
overwhelm any DDoS mitigation system, Gatekeeper included. However, Gate-
keeper’s ability to scale along four axes (more: VPs, Gatekeeper servers, network
devices, lcores) makes global deployments of Gatekeeper suitable for protection
at the scale of multiple Tbps. This capacity at least matches the magnitude of the
largest known attacks.
Deployability. Previous solutions were hampered by deployability issues, such
as requiring extra-architectural mechanisms or non-incentivized collaboration be-
tween networks. However, Gatekeeper operates completely within the current In-
ternet architecture by leveraging the existing infrastructure of globally distributed
vantage points. Such vantage points also enable Gatekeeper to circumvent the ne-
cessity of mutual deployment with other networks, since it gives the deploying
network a presence close to traffic sources to enforce network capabilities.
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2.3 IMPLEMENTATION
Gatekeeper was designed to be deployable, and its implementation reflects that.
It was built with performance, scalability, and operational requirements in mind.
More than just a research prototype, the Gatekeeper software product combines
advances in packet processing technology together with hardware offloading and
a suite of desirable features for network operators. We now present an overview
of the implementation details of Gatekeeper, and reflect on the implementation of
the design decisions that drive Gatekeeper to be deployable.
2.3.1 Packet Processing Framework
A key concern for Gatekeeper is its dependence on, and its choice of, a packet
processing framework. Typical operating system network stacks are well-suited
for generality and are acceptable for a wide range of applications. However, they
are too slow to keep pace with high-speed networks, and are not ideal for the
packet and bandwidth processing needs of a DDoS mitigation system. Several
packet processing frameworks such as netmap (Rizzo, 2012), Intel DPDK (DPDK,
2020), Fastclick (Barbette et al., 2015), PF_RING (PF_RING, 2020), and PacketShader
I/O (Han et al., 2010) have been proposed to enable network applications to skip
the overhead of the OS network stacks and provide line-rate network I/O. For
Gatekeeper, Intel’s Data Plane Development Kit, or DPDK, was the best choice.
DPDK provides excellent performance in terms of throughput and packet process-
ing latency (Gallenmüller et al., 2015), and its development is stable and driven by
many industry collaborators.
At its core, DPDK is a set of libraries that accelerates packet processing work-
loads running on a wide variety of CPU architectures. DPDK enables link layer
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frames to bypass the kernel networking stack and be delivered directly to appli-
cations. The main advantage of kernel bypass techniques like this is speed: tra-
ditional kernel networking stacks are comparatively bloated to provide generality
of processing across a variety of link layer, network layer, and transport layer pro-
tocols. In DPDK, applications are essentially handed a simple buffer of bytes for
each frame, and any protocol-specific processing must be implemented by the ap-
plication developer. For example, there is no TCP implementation in DPDK, so
DPDK cannot easily be used to manage connections as a TCP endpoint. However,
a DPDK application could easily and efficiently sample TCP packets for measure-
ment purposes, or perform transport layer load balancing. For a DDoS mitigation
system like Gatekeeper, the speed advantage far outweighs the loss of generality
disadvantage.
Gatekeeper heavily relies on three key features in DPDK: (1) NUMA-aware
memory management, which can reduce the memory access latency by allowing
CPU cores to access local memory instead of remote memory; (2) burst packet I/O,
which allows Gatekeeper to receive and send packets in batches, reducing the per-
packet cost of accessing and updating queues; (3) lockless rings, which provide an
efficient concurrency control mechanism packet buffer allocation and inter-thread
communication. More details about the software and hardware techniques used
by Gatekeeper are given in Section 2.3.4 and Section 2.3.3, respectively.
An important piece of terminology in DPDK parlance is lcore, which DPDK de-
fines as a logical execution unit of the processor, also known as a hardware thread.
The Gatekeeper software is decomposed into specialized blocks, each of which is
mapped to (at least one) lcore. We now describe each of these components and
their role in the system.
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2.3.2 Functional Block Decomposition
Gatekeeper and Grantor servers are implemented as a single piece of software,
composed of functional blocks that represent the core components and services of
the system. Configuration settings determine whether the executable runs as Gate-
keeper or Grantor. There were three factors influencing the decision to decompose
the systems into functional blocks in a single executable. First, having a single
piece of software simplifies the engineering, configuration, and administration of
the system. Second, it provides for separation of concerns and modularity, which
allows the re-use of blocks that are common to both Gatekeeper and Grantor. Fi-
nally, it allows fine-tuning of system performance; each block is given one or more
DPDK lcores, so operators can easily scale-up the blocks that implement data plane
operations without wasting resources on low-bandwidth control plane operations.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 present block-level views of the implementations of Gate-
keeper and Grantor. Notice that the model of a Gatekeeper server has two physical
NICs. One interface is connected to the VP router or switch, which we denote as
the front interface of Gatekeeper, and one interface connected to the private link(s)
to the AS deploying Gatekeeper, which we call back interface of Gatekeeper. Gate-
keeper requires separate interfaces because otherwise, if there was only a single
network interface, a Gatekeeper server under attack may not receive policy deci-
sions coming from Grantor servers due to the saturation of the interface. In con-
trast, Grantor servers each have a single interface and connect to the network seg-
ment of the destination network’s servers.
Each rounded-edge block in the diagram represents an lcore. The GK, GT, and
SOL blocks are able to be mapped to multiple lcores, so they are shown as stacks
of rounded-edge blocks. All other functional blocks are assigned at most one lcore.
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Each arrow leaving or arriving at a network interface represents an RX (receive) or
TX (transmit) queue on the interface, respectively. Notable hardware and software
features are labeled, which include (1) RSS, receive-side scaling, which allows re-
ceived packets to be spread among multiple queues on the same NIC for load bal-
ancing purposes; (2) lockless rings for message passing between blocks; (3) filters,
or declarative traffic rules, which enable Gatekeeper to map certain protocols to
functional blocks; (4) the KNI, or kernel-NIC interface, a way for DPDK to interface
with the Linux kernel through a network device; and (5) a Unix socket, which pro-
vides the means for Gatekeeper to communicate with a client program for runtime
configuration. More information about these components are presented alongside
their associated functional blocks, which are described next.
Figure 2.4: Gatekeeper block diagram.
2.3.2.1 GK block
The Gatekeeper (GK) block is the main component of Gatekeeper servers, as its
task is to accept incoming packets, perform lookups that map flows to policy de-
cisions, and queue requests and granted packets for transmission to Grantor. It
is in the data plane and can scale across multiple GK instances, each with a ded-
icated lcore. Gatekeeper utilizes RSS to distribute incoming packets among the
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GK instances. Each instance processes a queue whose packets have unique pairs
of source and destination addresses. RSS provides the guarantee that packets be-
longing to the same flow will be directed to the same RX queue, and therefore the
same GK instance, in the order that they arrive at Gatekeeper. Therefore, each GK
instance maintains its own lockless flow hash table whose keys are these (source,
destination) pairs. Because of its position on the front lines of the data plane, mean-
ing it will bear the brunt of attacks, the GK block uses prefetching, batching, and
other memory optimization techniques to maintain performance (Fu, 2020).
The main algorithm of the GK block is to read a batch of packets from the front
interface and perform flow lookups over the batch. Packets whose flows have
entries in the table are handled according to the flow entry – drop, forward, or
apply a BPF program. Packets whose flows are not in the flow table are looked
up in an LPM table that defines the forwarding action. Most flows are forwarded
to Grantor (first as a request), but GK blocks also support Gatekeeper bypass for
incremental deployment and peering traffic. For these flows, the GK block simply
forwards the packets to the opposite interface.
Additionally, Gatekeeper implements the full-functionality option of maintain-
ing the ECN bits for IP-in-IP packets (Floyd et al., 2001), which maintains any
congestion management occurring between the source and destination.
2.3.2.2 GT block
The Grantor (GT) block is the main component of Grantor servers, as its task is
to accept incoming packets from Gatekeeper servers, issue policy decisions for
requests, and forward granted packets to their ultimate destination. It is in the
data plane and can scale across multiple lcores. Chapter 3 provides a thorough
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overview of the role of the policies that the GT block manages.
Figure 2.5: Grantor block diagram.
2.3.2.3 Solicitor (SOL) block
The SOL block is responsible for rate limiting and sending request packets. Re-
quests are sorted by priority and only permitted a fraction of the link capacity
between Gatekeeper and Grantor, and the SOL block enforces these limits. The pri-
ority queue (fully described in Section 2.2.4.3) is implemented as a length-limited
linked list of request packets, indexed by an array whose elements are references
to the portion of the linked list that holds packets of each priority, providing con-
stant time insertion, dequeuing of the highest priority request, and deletion of the
lowest priority request when the queue is full. The SOL block only runs when the
Gatekeeper program is being run as a Gatekeeper server. Multiple SOL instances
are used to spread the load from multiple GK instances.
2.3.2.4 GT-GK Unit (GGU) block
The GT-GK unit (GGU) processes all policy decisions that Grantor servers send to
a Gatekeeper server. Each packet coming from a Grantor server carries a set of
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decisions. The GGU block demultiplexes each decision to the GK instance that is
responsible for the flow in question, according to its RSS hash. Note that GGU
only operates on the “back” interface of Gatekeeper (the interface that leads to the
protected AS).
The GGU loads a set of GT-GK packets from the back NIC. For each packet
in this set, it loops over each policy decision on the packet, and for each decision
does the following: (1) identify which GK block is responsible for the pair (source,
destination) addresses in the decision; (2) obtain the mailbox of that GK block; (3)
send the policy decision to the GK block via the mailbox.
2.3.2.5 Control plane support (CPS) block
Gatekeeper servers must be able to use routing daemons to peer in IXPs. Similar
to Google’s Espresso (Yap et al., 2017), we implemented this peering functional-
ity in Gatekeeper servers. Instead of adding support for a multitude of common
control plane protocols (e.g., BGP, OSPF, and IS-IS) in Gatekeeper directly, we en-
able network operators to use existing routing daemons and management tools by
leveraging the DPDK kernel-NIC interface (KNI) library. In our deployment, the
CPS block uses the popular BGP speaker BIRD (BIRD, 2020).
2.3.2.6 Link layer support (LLS) block
The LLS block has the responsibility of handling all link layer protocols and ad-
dress resolution services, such as ARP, Neighbor Discovery, and Link Aggregation
Control Protocol (LACP). Instead of resolving IP addresses to MAC addresses on
demand, other functional blocks must register the IP addresses that they are inter-
ested in, and the LLS block keeps IP address-to-link layer address maps updated.
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To guarantee that other blocks are not kept waiting for resolution requests, the
components that query the LLS block will drop packets directly instead of waiting
for a resolution if the map is not current.
2.3.2.7 Dynamic configuration block
Both Gatekeeper and Grantor have two types of configurations: static and dynamic
configurations. When Gatekeeper boots, it configures the network and individual
functional blocks using the static Lua configuration files. Several features, such
as jumbo frames, MTU, IP/UDP header checksum offloading and VLAN headers,
can also be configured for operational demands.
The dynamic configuration block allows operators to change the parameters
of Gatekeeper and Grantor servers and to diagnose runtime issues. For example,
operators can update the IP ranges handled by GK blocks, list the ARP and ND
tables for network diagnosis, update the enforced policy on Grantor servers, and
flush all policy decisions cached at Gatekeeper servers associated with a given
destination IP.
2.3.3 Hardware Offloading
DPDK applications are most efficient when they can leverage packet processing
optimizations via hardware features on specialized NICs. Gatekeeper uses several
of these hardware features, including RSS and multiqueues, filters, and checksum
offloading.
RSS and multi-queues. To fully utilize the potential of the modern multi-
/manycore CPUs, Gatekeeper uses NICs with multi-queue and receive-side scaling
(RSS) support. The multi-queue support allows different lcores to access different
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queues on the NIC without contending with each other. RSS is used to distribute
incoming packets to the different queues, each of which is serviced by a different
lcore. RSS ensures that packets belonging to the same flow will be processed by
the same lcore in the same order as they arrive at Gatekeeper server, thus avoid-
ing out-of-order packet delivery. A NIC that is RSS-enabled uses a hash function
to compute a hash value over a defined area in packet headers. The defined area
can be non-contiguous, but Gatekeeper hashes over the IP source and destination
addresses. A number of least significant bits of the hash value are used to index an
indirection table. The values in the indirection table are used to assign the received
data to a queue/lcore. In order to calculate the RSS hash value, the hash function
uses a secret key of the RSS hash as input. To mitigate vulnerabilities that target
the RSS hash, Gatekeeper randomizes the secret key on startup.
Filters. For best performance, Gatekeeper leverages NICs that support Ether-
Type and ntuple filters. EtherType filters allow packets to be steered on the basis of
the EtherType field of the Ethernet header. This allows, for example, ARP packets
to be steered to the LLS block without touching the data plane of the Gatekeeper
or Grantor servers. Ntuple filters allow packets to be steered to queues on the ba-
sis of L3 and L4 headers. This allows, for example, BGP packets to be directed to
the CPS block. Without EtherType or ntuple filters, all packets are received by the
GK block and are distributed to the other blocks using ACLs to find the correct
functional block, and Gatekeeper mailboxes to transfer the packets.
Checksums. Since all packets that Gatekeeper decides to forward are encapsu-
lated, the outer IP header requires checksum computation. To minimize the encap-
sulation effort, IP header checksum computatoin is offloaded to hardware when
supported by the NICs, saving CPU cycles. Similarly, packets sent from Grantor to
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Gatekeeper (policy decisions) are sent using UDP, and therefore L4 checksum of-
floading is also enabled when supported by hardware. When checksum offloading
is not supported, Gatekeeper calculates the checksums in software.
2.3.4 Software Techniques
In addition to hardware features, Gatekeeper leverages several optimizations in
software to speed up packet processing, including batching, prefetching, lockless
rings, and access control lists. A more thorough overview of the techniques we
used is described in Fu (2020).
Batching. To reduce system call overhead, Gatekeeper utilizes batching as of-
ten as possible. Reads and writes to the network interfaces, transfers of packets to
different blocks via mailboxes, access control list lookups, flow lookups, and LPM
table lookups are all performed in batches.
Prefetching. Since data plane performance is critical to Gatekeeper, we added
prefetching instructions where needed to allow Gatekeeper to fetch data for the
L1 cache ahead of demand, hiding memory latency by removing load instructions
from the critical path.
Lockless rings. Often, data plane packets or Gatekeeper metadata needs to be
passed between functional blocks. For example, request packets are sent to the
Solicitor block from the GK block for priority queueing. To efficiently perform this
handoff, Gatekeeper uses the lockless consumer/producer ring library of DPDK.
Access control lists. Gatekeeper depends on the ability to steer certain types
of control plane packets to the CPS, LLS, and GGU functional blocks. When the
available hardware does not support EtherType filters or ntuple filters, or when
certain types of packets cannot be adequately matched using those filters, Gate-
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keeper uses DPDK’s highly performant access control list library to match packets
and transmit them to different blocks.
2.3.5 Operational Features
Gatekeeper provides several features that are key for real world deployments.
These operational features include bonded devices and LACP, VLAN configura-
tion, routing daemon support, fragmentation handling, and operational logging.
Bonded devices and LACP. To meet operational demands, Gatekeeper enables
the Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) to automatically bond physical
ports to a single logical channel, which is required by some Internet exchanges.
VLAN. It is common practice for IXPs to assign VLAN IDs to each member,
and require each frame to carry a VLAN tag. Gatekeeper supports variable-length
Ethernet headers so that VLAN tags may be inserted or removed as desired. Gate-
keeper also supports separate VLAN tags for IPv4 traffic and IPv6 traffic.
Control plane using KNI and BIRD. Since Gatekeeper forces its attached net-
work interfaces to use DPDK and forego the Linux kernel networking stack, other
standard network tools cannot run on Gatekeeper interfaces. To reduce barriers to
deployment, Gatekeeper provides the ability for existing control plane tools (such
as routing daemons) to be used as-is alongside Gatekeeper by using the DPDK
kernel-NIC interface. This creates a virtual network interface that a routing dae-
mon can run on, while being able to make route announcements and adjust the
routing tables of Gatekeeper. We created a patch (Doucette, 2020) of the control
plane tool BIRD (BIRD, 2020) to be able to deliver routing table updates directly to
Gatekeeper instead of the Linux kernel.
Fragmentation. At Gatekeeper servers, fragmented packets (which often indi-
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cate abuse) can be given secondary bandwidth or dropped using policy enforce-
ment programs. Grantor servers may need to reassemble fragmented packets be-
fore making policy decisions. To do so, they utilize the DPDK IP fragmentation
and reassembly library. Additionally, to avoid attackers overflowing the request
channel with fragments that never complete, flows associated with fragments that
have to be discarded before being fully assembled are punished.
Log rate-limiting. Gatekeeper provides configurable logging for every func-
tional block and library. Importantly, in a DDoS mitigation system, the logging
subsystem may become a target of attack by malicious actors hoping to exhaust
Gatekeeper’s storage or waste CPU cycles on I/O. Therefore, each functional block




In this section, Gatekeeper is evaluated along several axes:
• Basic functionality and accuracy. It should accurately reflect the policies it is
given to enforce and sufficiently mitigate infrastructure layer attacks to allow
legitimate clients to maintain service. Since the request channel is a critical
component of network capability systems, it should also mitigate attacks on
the request channel itself. Simply put: does Gatekeeper work as advertised?
• The effect of different policies. Policy enforcement programs are more than
just simple token bucket algorithms, and have the ability to inspect transport
layer headers for the purposes of secondary bandwidth limits, apply nega-
tive bandwidth, etc. How does policy richness affect the mitigation attacks?
• Performance benchmarking. The peak attack capacity is of particular inter-
est for DDoS mitigation systems. How far can Gatekeeper be pushed against
various workloads and load testing parameters?
• Cost analysis. Given the cost asymmetry between attackers and defenders
in the DDoS game, deployment cost is an important metric in evaluating
a mitigation system. We consider both capital and operating expenses in
asking: how costly is Gatekeeper?
2.4.2 Testbeds
The Gatekeeper evaluation is performed across two testing environments: (1) a
Dell PowerEdge R640 server, which is used for performance benchmarking a Gate-
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keeper server; (2) Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud (AWS EC2), which
is used for end-to-end evaluations that include clients, Gatekeeper servers, Grantor
servers, and destination servers.
2.4.2.1 PowerEdge Server Specifications
To benchmark a Gatekeeper server in a realistic production environment, we use
a Dell PowerEdge R640 rack server. The server has 768 GB of memory along with
two Intel Xeon Silver 4214R 2.4 GHz processors, each equipped with 16.5 MB of
cache space and 12 cores with 24 threads. For networking, the server has two Intel
X550 10 Gbps adapters.
2.4.2.2 AWS EC2
The Amazon testbed provides an environment where Gatekeeper can be tested
end-to-end, to measure the effect the system has on legitimate clients during an at-
tack. The testbed is composed of an attacking client instance, which runs a packet
generator to launch floods from 16k virtual attackers (source IPs) to a destination
Web server in an attempt to overwhelm the destination’s available bandwidth. The
testbed also has a legitimate client, which uses curl to repeatedly upload a 20 KB
file to the destination server. For each experiment, the legitimate client uploads
the file 50 times, and the average file transfer time is computed across all trans-
fers. For experiments where Gatekeeper is used, packets are redirected from the
attacking client and the legitimate client to Gatekeeper using encapsulation. Gate-
keeper transmits some subset of these packets (according to the policy for a given
experiment) to Grantor, and packets sent along the Gatekeeper-Grantor path are
processed by a Linux router instance that enforces the Gatekeeper queueing algo-
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rithm. The topology of the testbed is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Amazon testbed topology.
However, there are some limitations with the Amazon testbed:
• Instance type. Amazon provides a range of virtual machine instance types
for different use cases and applications. Not all instance types use NICs that
DPDK supports. Gatekeeper and Grantor must be run on instance types that
use the Elastic Network Adapter (ENA) (Barr, 2016), which is supported by
DPDK.
• Lack of support for some RSS features. Although the Amazon ENA nomi-
nally supports RSS to spread flows to multiple instances of the GK block, we
found that in practice its support for various RSS features was lacking, and
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therefore could not fully be used with Gatekeeper. Without RSS, the GK and
GT blocks cannot scale up to use more lcores, and therefore Gatekeeper’s
and Grantor’s processing power is limited to a single lcore for data plane
processing.
• Lack of hardware offloading. The ENA does not support some hardware
features that Gatekeeper would otherwise leverage, including EtherType fil-
ters and ntuple filters. This means that protocols like ARP and BGP, which
would otherwise have been directed to the LLS and CPS blocks automati-
cally, take up CPU cycles to be received by the GK block and sent via mail-
boxes to their appropriate blocks.
• Low packet throughput. Users on EC2 can be rate-limited by the policies of
the Amazon virtual network. During testing, it was found that with mini-
mum sized packets, 64 bytes, the Amazon virtual network would cap trans-
fer limits at 300 Mbps across instances, even if more instances were added.
• Inconsistent byte throughput. Some instances on EC2 are given a variable
amount of network capacity, e.g., “up to 5 Gbps,” which in practice may only
result in 2-3 Gbps on average with a peak performance of 5 Gbps.
• Bandwidth limits are imposed per-instance. Bandwidth limitations are ap-
plied per-instance, not per-interface. For example, a Gatekeeper server (with
both a front and back interface) running on an instance with a 10 Gbps capac-
ity must split that capacity between receiving packets on the front interface
and sending them on the back interface.
• Fair queueing. From our experiments, we speculate that there may be some
type of per-flow fair queueing imposed by the Amazon virtual network.
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When the attacks are split between a relatively small number of attacking
flows (1K-2K), the legitimate client is always able to immediately connect,
regardless of overall attack strength. However, significantly increasing the
number of flows (16k) seems to nullify this effect, causing the legitimate
client to wait proportionally longer as the attack strength increases.
The effect of these limitations is that Gatekeeper cannot be consistently tested
at the scale of tens of Gbps with minimum packet size, which is a realistic and
desirable evaluation scenario, since clients cannot consistently achieve rates that
high, and Gatekeepers, Grantors, and destination servers can not consistently re-
ceive and transmit at rates that high. Moreover, because of the limitations of RSS
and other hardware features, Gatekeeper and Grantor are limited in their packet
processing capacity.
Therefore, the EC2 instance type for the destination server is chosen to have
fairly low capacity, around 1 Gbps, and the system is evaluated using only up to
around 10 Gbps of attack traffic composed of large (1024 byte) packets. Unless
otherwise noted, the attacks use floods of TCP traffic, i.e., TCP packets carrying
application data, without SYNs. We use a static set of 16,000 attacking flows re-
gardless of the attack strength. Unless otherwise noted, Gatekeeper servers use
the m5.8xlarge instance type.
2.4.3 Baseline Functionality
To evaluate Gatekeeper at its most basic functionality, we measured its effect on
the file transfer time of a legitimate client during a flooding attack. To do so, we
used the Amazon EC2 testbed to flood a destination server with up to 10 Gbps of
traffic from 16,000 flows. The traffic was first directed through Gatekeeper, which
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granted all flows using the baseline granted BPF program (no secondary or nega-
tive bandwidth) at rates of 16 Kbps, 32 Kbps, and 64 Kbps.
During the attack, we used a legitimate client to upload a 20 KB file to the
destination server using the curl application. The results are shown in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: The time to transfer a 20 KB file during an attack while
varying the policy’s granted rate limit.
The result is that the rate limit of the granted flows has much more of an impact
on the legitimate client’s file transfer time than the attack does. In fact, the attack
does not seem to have an effect, except at around 10 Gbps, which is the capacity of
the Gatekeeper server. At very low rates, such as 16 Kbps, it takes about 20 seconds
(20 token bucket refill periods) for the legitimate client to be able to transfer the file.
As the rate limit increases to 32 Kbps and then 64 Kbps, the legitimate client is able
to transfer the file more quickly while the attack itself is still mitigated.
For reference, we also included trials of the legitimate client trying to connect
when no Gatekeeper or Grantor servers are running. The file transfer time in-
creases exponentially up through trials with 5 Gbps of attack traffic. Beyond that
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point, the legitimate client times out when trying to perform the transfer.
2.4.4 Effect of Policies
We now further explore the effect that policies can have by introducing the sec-
ondary bandwidth and negative bandwidth mechanisms. More information and
example policies can be found in Section 3.4.
2.4.4.1 Secondary Bandwidth Limit
A secondary bandwidth limit (described further in Section 3.4.3.1) allows Gate-
keeper to impose a second, lower limit for certain types of traffic within flows,
such as ICMP, UDP, or TCP SYN packets. In this evaluation, we change the traffic
flood to be composed of TCP SYN packets, and change the policy decision to apply
a secondary bandwidth to TCP SYNs. The primary bandwidth limit is 256 Kbps,
and the secondary bandwidth is set to be 1.6 Kbps (5% of the primary limit). The
results are shown in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: The time to transfer a 20 KB file during a SYN flood attack
with no defense and with a Gatekeeper policy that bins TCP SYNs
into a secondary bandwidth limit.
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The result is that the TCP SYN flood is instantly mitigated by Gatekeeper. Up
through around 1.25 Mpps, Gatekeeper sufficiently rate limits the TCP SYNs so
that the legitimate client is able to connect and transfer the file in a single rate
limiting period.
2.4.4.2 Negative Bandwidth
Policy enforcement programs that use negative bandwidth (described further in
Section 3.4.3.2) can punish flows that transmit beyond their allotted limit. We eval-
uate the effect of negative bandwidth by building off of the basic policy evaluation,
increasing the rate limit for each flow to be 128 Kbps and then 256 Kbps during at-
tacks of increasing strength. We then performed trials with the same rate limits,
but applied a policy that enforced negative bandwidth when flows exceeded those
limits. For all trials, we measured the average file transfer time of a legitimate
client. The results are shown in Figure 2.9. tically
Figure 2.9: The time to transfer a 20 KB file during an attack with a
policy that applies negative bandwidth.
The result is that negative bandwidth policies can have a major impact on al-
69
lowing legitimate clients to maintain service. Between 1 Gbps and 2 Gbps, attack-
ing flows that are allotted 128 Kbps need to send above that limit to keep up the
attack strength. By 2 Gbps, it takes 10s for the file to be transferred, although Gate-
keeper limits the attack traffic sufficiently all the way up to 10 Gbps to keep the
file transfer time at 10s. On the other hand, the 128 Kbps policy with the negative
bandwidth (“w/negative”) forces the attackers to push their bandwidth allotment
increasingly negative as the attack strength increases. By 2 Gbps, the legitimate
client is able to transfer the file as if there were no attack at all.
The same outcome is observed for the 256 Kbps trials. Although the higher
limit allows the attack to be successful at higher rates, driving the file transfer time
to be 50s by 3 Gbps, soon after that the bandwidth allotment is overwhelmed and
the legitimate client is able to quickly transfer the file.
2.4.5 Performance Benchmarking
We also measured the performance of a single Gatekeeper server when under
stress by evaluating it against an attack with high source address churn on the
PowerEdge server. We fully randomized the source address of the attacking flows,
creating an indefinite stream of new flows, aiming to exhaust the flow table state
in GK blocks. We also used attack traffic composed of just 64 byte packets. On
handling packets, Gatekeeper performed the simplest possible action: a drop. We
measured the capacity of Gatekeeper to process this traffic by varying the flow ta-
ble size2 and the number of GK instances (lcores/threads). The results are shown
in Figure 2.10.
2Measured in flow table entries, each of which is 128 bytes.
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Figure 2.10: The throughput of Gatekeeper during an attack with
maximum flow table churn and minimum packet size.
The result is that even under extreme conditions – minimum sized packets,
a full flow table, and new flows constantly arriving – Gatekeeper can process at
least 8 Mpps (up to the packet generator’s maximum limit) under certain flow
table and GK instance configurations. For context, being able to process 10 Mpps
is considered highly performant (Majkowski, 2018). Additionally, 8 Mpps is the
equivalent of 5 Gbps when using minimum-sized packets.
There is a significant benefit in increasing the number of GK block instances/l-
cores from one to two, as the throughput nearly doubles. Beyond two GK in-
stances, the benefit may appear insignificant, but this is likely because Gatekeeper
is already processing packets as fast as the generator is sending them. Therefore,
measuring the effect of more GK instances may require separating the packet gen-
erator onto its own hardware.
71
2.4.6 Cost Analysis
One of the motivating factors that drove the design of Gatekeeper was to keep it
affordable and within reach of smaller ISPs, enterprises, institutions, etc. In this
section, we provide a back-of-the-envelope evaluation of the cost of Gatekeeper,
as well as an evaluation regarding the effectiveness of Gatekeeper deployments in
Amazon, using instances at different prices.
2.4.6.1 Deployment Cost
We now present rough estimates of the operational cost of two Gatekeeper deploy-
ment scenarios: (1) a deployment of 2.3 Tbps of bandwidth protection, which rep-
resents one of the largest reported DDoS attacks by volume (AWS, 2020a), as well
as (2) a deployment that balances peak capacity and cost. We contrast our cost
estimates with defense costs that were made public during the headline-grabbing
DDoS attack against KrebsOnSecurity, a popular Internet security blog (Krebs, 2016).
To shield a single AS with 2.3 Tbps of bandwidth protection, our modeled de-
ployment would use 23 VPs, each with 100 Gbps of incoming traffic capacity. Con-
servatively estimating the cost of operating at each VP at $5K per month3, the
operational cost of this deployment would be $1.38M per year. This estimate in-
cludes the quoted price to contract a link in an IXP, and then is rounded up to
guesstimate additional operational costs, such as those to contract layer 2 connec-
tivity to the deploying network. While $1.38M per year is out of reach for many
deploying ASes, it is favorable compared to the cost of “millions of dollars” that
Akamai estimated (Bray, 2016) was needed to protect KrebsOnSecurity.
3We could not identify public data to back this estimate, but our industry partners have verified
that this value covers their market price estimate to deploy Gatekeeper at an IXP.
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While rather large DDoS attacks do grab headlines, according to Arbor Net-
works, 99% of the DDoS attacks in 2016 peaked at less than 20 Gbps (Anstee et al.,
2017, Figure AT3). Thus, an AS willing to endure downtime when a 1% tail DDoS
attack hits would have a much cheaper deployment: $12K per year, using the same
assumptions as the first estimate. Not only is this operational cost in reach of small
and medium sized potential deployers, but it also stands favorably against a cheap
20 Gbps-protection contract against infrastructure-layer attacks offered by an es-
tablished security company4: $24K per year.
Due to the fact that small and medium sized deployers may lack the adminis-
trative resources to manage a deployment, they may not be able to deploy Gate-
keeper on their own. But, for the cost of $12K per year, 150 such ASes could afford
the 2.3 Tbps protection described above, and would still have $420K per year to
share professional management of the system. According to the AWS Shield pric-
ing (AWS, 2020a), the yearly fee alone for 150 companies would be $5.4M. Taking
the calculation one step further, a provider like AWS likely has more than 1,000
client members, pushing the total cost to approximately $36M per year. With this
sum, Gatekeeper could be operated at 7,200 VPs.
The estimated costs of the Gatekeeper deployments above show that Gate-
keeper is cheaper and scales better than the current solutions in the market, po-
tentially reducing cost by more than 3X. Finally, note that this cost analysis is con-
servative, since all deployment scenarios are based on IXPs. Deployments that
use cloud providers may further lower the operational cost, since cloud providers
enable ASes to quickly scale up and down the number of VPs and computing ca-
pacity without infrastructure investment.
4We are not at liberty to publicly state which company.
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2.4.6.2 Amazon Instance Variation
We also evaluated how changing the instance type (and therefore price) of the
Gatekeeper server in the Amazon testbed affects the results of some of the previous
experiments. For all of the previous Amazon experiments, our baseline instance
type for the Gatekeeper server was the m5.8xlarge. This is a fairly expensive in-
stance type, and there are cheaper instances in the same family that could be used,
trading off CPU and memory for cost. We compared three instance types in the
same family in the US East (Ohio) region, as shown in Table 2.2. For this region,
the savings between the instance types scales linearly. The cost savings per hour,
compared to using the m5.8xlarge instance, is also shown.
Instance vCPUs Mem (GiB) B/W Price/Hr Savings/Hr
m5.8xlarge 32 128 10 Gbps $1.536 N/A
m5.4xlarge 16 64 Up to 10 Gbps $0.768 $0.768
m5.2xlarge 8 32 Up to 10 Gbps $0.384 $1.152
Table 2.2: Different types of instances evaluated for a Gatekeeper
server in AWS EC2.
Since Gatekeeper requires at least 5 vCPUs for basic operation (one for each
of the relevant functional blocks), cheaper instances with fewer vCPUs than the
m5.2xlarge could not be used. The M5 instance type family is for general-purpose
computing; other instance type families had significantly poorer network perfor-
mance for approximately the same price, so only the M5 was evaluated.
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Figure 2.11: The time to transfer a 20 KB file during an attack with
varying Gatekeeper instance types and prices.
Figure 2.11 depicts the results of a 20 KB file transfer with attack traffic and
Gatekeeper defenses deployed at various AWS instance types. We apply a 128
Kbps rate limit to all 16,000 attack flows as well as the legitimate client flow. We
found that for these parameters, there are no significant performance benefits, and
approximately the same performance for attacks up to 10 Gbps could be achieved
using a m5.2xlarge instance at 25% of the price. However, it is worth noting that if
the Amazon testbed fully supported RSS, instances with more vCPUs could utilize





Since network capability systems perform admission control for the network layer
connections into the destination network, the network operator must have mech-
anisms to decide which flows should be granted access and at what rates. Most
previous capability proposals only provide a high level description of how such
destination policies would work, allowing access only in response to outgoing traf-
fic or to registered users (Anderson et al., 2004), rate limiting all traffic according to
link load and packet loss measurements (Liu et al., 2010), or by using default byte
rates or application-layer cookies and CAPTCHAs (Yang et al., 2005). Still other
capability proposals do not discuss the destination policy issue, focusing only on
the capability mechanism (Yaar et al., 2004).
In order to be deployable, Gatekeeper provides practical mechanisms for des-
tination policy specification. In this chapter, we provide a policy toolkit as a guide
for network operators looking to create a Gatekeeper deployment. Gatekeeper
actually has two policy mechanisms: one at Grantor servers to make policy deci-
sions about flows, and one at Gatekeeper servers to enforce policies over individ-
ual packets. We give an overview of both mechanisms in Section 3.2, and describe
how to map the specifications of a network under deployment to a set of policies
in Section 3.3.
The correctness and precision of the policies can make or break a Gatekeeper
deployment, since adversaries that find vulnerabilities in, or take advantage of,
policies can circumvent the protections that the system provides. Fortunately,
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Gatekeeper provides a rich array of possibilities for applying policies to traffic,
which we break down into basic policy techniques that most deployments should
use (Section 3.4), as well as advanced techniques that could offer solutions for at-
tack detection, source spoofing prevention, and authentication, as well as provide
opportunities for further research (Section 3.5).
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3.2 POLICY DESIGN
This section presents the design choices that shaped the format of policies and a
deployment-tested template to write policies.
The design of Gatekeeper policies borrows heavily from two streams of prior
work: capability and filtering systems to regulate the transmission rate of flows,
and SDN to centralize this decision-making process (see Section 2.2.3). However,
the design choice of implementing destination policies as programs represents a
breakthrough in the context of DDoS mitigation systems. Prior work implemented
policies as sets of rules that are pattern matched to packets or flows. These rules
and patterns are described under a predefined declarative language. The motiva-
tion for using declarative languages is to provide abstractions for hardware oper-
ations and filters. These languages, however, become the weakest link in a DDoS
protection system when attacks target their limitations. For example, the Catch-22
attack shows that attackers can force source address filtering mechanisms in legacy
routers into an untenable position: either use coarse-grained (/16 prefix) filtering
rules and incur large amounts of collateral damage, or use fine-grained filtering
rules (/32 prefix) and risk not mitigating the attack (Shi et al., 2019).
Running Gatekeeper policies as programs does not require giving up the hard-
ware abstractions. However, it enables us to move away from declarative lan-
guages and toward bytecode virtual machines (VMs). We chose to adopt policies
as programs in two ways:
1. A set of policy enforcement programs that are run at Gatekeeper servers. On
ingress, a packet’s flow is extracted and mapped to the executable enforce-
ment program that it has been assigned. Policy enforcement programs may
keep state, e.g., for a token bucket algorithm, to decide whether to drop or
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accept traffic at a prescribed rate.
2. A single policy decision program that is run at Grantor servers. The decision
program maps flows to policy enforcement programs, and installs rules re-
flecting those decisions at Gatekeeper so that the enforcement program can
be run on subsequent packets in the given flow.
Breaking the policy process up into decision-making and enforcement parts
has two advantages. First, it enables Gatekeeper to take prompt action on flows
that misbehave after receiving a favorable policy decision, e.g., by applying sec-
ondary rate limits or by tracking negative bandwidth at policy enforcement time
(Section 3.4). Previous capability systems have relied on capability expiration or
bandwidth caps to mitigate this issue (Yaar et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2005).
Second, it allows us to separately choose the best fitting bytecode VMs for Gate-
keeper and Grantor servers. Gatekeeper servers perform policy enforcement using
VMs that run extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) programs (McCanne & Jacob-
son, 1993), whereas the policy decision program running on Grantor servers are
implemented using a Lua VM (Ierusalimschy et al., 2006). The key requirements
that led us to choose Lua on Grantor servers was (1) its support for dynamically
editing the policy (e.g., redefining functions, modules, variables) in order to en-
able changing the policy with minimum or no impact to deployed systems, and (2)
ease of integration with external libraries (typically in C). eBPF was chosen to im-
plement policy enforcement programs due to (1) the availability of static analysis
to guarantee termination, memory safety, and bounded resources (Gershuni et al.,
2019) and (2) ease of packet inspection.
While eBPF has been used in production to implement packet redirection in
load balancers (Wragg, 2020; Shirokov & Dasineni, 2018) and high-performance,
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ad hoc packet filters in DDoS protection systems (Fabre, 2019), the use of eBPF pro-
grams in Gatekeeper to perform policy enforcement brings greater flexibility. The
difference in these approaches is in the amount of state space under the control of
eBPF programs. For example, eBPF programs in Gatekeeper can limit bandwidth
per flow, while the eBPF programs running on other systems have only enough
state to do so for a limited number of classes.
3.2.1 Decision Types
Each decision made by a policy decision program falls into one of three categories:
declined, granted, or BPF.
For declined flows, the only parameter that needs to be specified by the de-
cision program is the lifespan of the decision. Although declined decisions can
be used when attacks are detected, defining an attack is widely known to be a
difficult problem in general. Therefore, we recommend mostly using declined de-
cisions for malformed packets or well known abusers such as bogons and malware
(Section 3.4.1). A reasonable timeout is on the scale of minutes, so that the effects
of false positives (e.g., malformed packets due to misconfiguration) and collat-
eral damage (e.g., innocent users who are behind the same source NAT process
as abusive users) are lessened, with the option for cheaply extending the declined
decision on expiry.
For granted flows, there are four parameters: the rate limit of the capability
as well as three arguments that define when the capability expires and how the
capability renewal request may proceed. The setting of these parameters is highly
dependent on the network profile mapping.
For BPF flows, there are four parameters: the lifespan of the decision, the index
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of the installed BPF program to be used at Gatekeeper, the length of a cookie to be
associated with the program, and the cookie itself. The cookie is a piece of memory
passed to the BPF program at execution time, allowing Gatekeeper to keep arbi-
trary per-flow state up to 64 bytes in size. Note the distinction between granted
flows and BPF flows: the built-in granted channel mechanism in Gatekeeper sim-
ply applies a single bandwidth limit to the flow, whereas BPF programs are also
generally applied to granted flows, but can flexibly inspect packet headers, keep
state, enforce multiple bandwidth limits, etc.
We next describe how to map the characteristics and requirements of a deploy-
ing network to policy decision and enforcement programs.
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3.3 WRITING POLICIES
We now present guidelines for writing policies in a Gatekeeper deployment. In
our discussions with network operators, we found that a policy is most naturally
organized as follows: policy decision programs (in Lua) inspect IP addresses to
map flows to policy enforcement (eBPF) programs, and eBPF programs inspect
transport headers to monitor the behavior of flows and adhere as best as possible
to the given policy decision.
As a rule of thumb, each eBPF program reflects a network service profile. For
example, consider the profile of outgoing email servers. They have no listening
sockets – they only open connections to the SMTP port of remote email servers,
and these connections have very small ingress traffic footprints. This profile-to-
program heuristic leads to a simple breakdown of the work to write a policy: (1)
identify all network profiles, (2) write an eBPF program for each of those profiles,
and (3) map flows to those eBPF programs in the Lua policy.
Following this proposed breakdown of work, Lua policies are given a number
of network prefixes with which to classify incoming packets based on their des-
tination addresses. We use longest prefix matching on destination addresses by
default, but also adopt flexible address classification to enable approximate source
location (MaxMind, 2020), threat identification (Team Cymru, 2020; The Spamhaus
Project SLU, 2020), and to check the purpose of the source (Cloudflare, 2020b; Ama-
zon Web Services, 2020; Google, 2020b), etc. This classification of source addresses
can be used to decide on denying or granting communication, limiting bandwidth,
and differentiating service.
While translating a network profile into an eBPF program, the policy writer
should classify packets into three bins: primary, secondary, and unwanted traffic.
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Primary traffic carries the main purpose of the service, while secondary traffic is
permitted traffic that has no reason to be present at the same scale of the primary
traffic. Examples of secondary traffic are TCP SYN, ICMP, and fragmented pack-
ets. Once the code for the classification of packets is in place, the policy writer
overlays it with two bandwidth limits: one limit before the classification to control
the bandwidth of the flow as a whole, and another limit for secondary traffic after
the classification. These limits can be implemented as token bucket algorithms.
Policies that follow the template explained above deal with the most common
forms of infrastructure attacks such as floods (e.g., SYN, UDP, ICMP), amplifica-
tions (e.g., DNS, NTP, Memcached), and arbitrary combinations of these attacks
(also known as multi-vector attacks). The fraction of the attack traffic that bypasses
these policies depends on how narrow the network profiles are, how precise they
are implemented in the policy enforcement programs, and the quality of the classi-
fications of the source addresses in the policy decision program. But even if these
factors are adjusted to perfection, some traffic attacks can only be identified by the
protected applications or intrusion detection systems (IDSes). In this case, appli-
cations and IDSes can feed the policy decision program with source addresses and
packet signatures to mitigate this sneaky traffic through ad hoc policy enforce-
ment programs and assignment of lower bandwidth limits. Gatekeeper cannot
help when there is no observable distinction between attack and legitimate traffic.
Finally, the policy template presented in this section leaves room for a potential
avenue for improvement: the fact that Grantor servers are colocated geograph-
ically. This geographical proximity often translates into low latency and ample
bandwidth between Grantor servers, which in turn, enables the employment of a
distributed database for the use of policies. With the help of this database, Lua
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policies could potentially identify spoofed source addresses analyzing the (source
address, incoming vantage point address) pair for inconsistencies, as well as make
sophisticated bandwidth allocation based on the source AS and load of the links
behind the Gatekeeper servers.
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3.4 BASIC POLICY TECHNIQUES
Recall that for each request (or capability renewal) packet received by Grantor, the
GT block parses it and passes a structure of packet information to the Lua policy,
which maps the packet data to a policy decision. To help accomplish this task,
Gatekeeper provides a basic set of policy functionality that will likely be used by
most deployments, which includes support for performing longest prefix match-
ing, port lookups, secondary and negative bandwidth, and the ability to rapidly
support new protocols as needed.
3.4.1 Host Lookups and Bogons
As described by the heuristics for writing policies, decisions will mainly be driven
by information derived from the network layer header, especially the source and
destination IP addresses.
Although source addresses can be spoofed (an issue that is addressed in Sec-
tion 3.5.1), there are simple checks that can be performed to filter flows based on
invalid addresses, or bogons (Team Cymru, 2020). Bogons include any IP address
in a range not allocated by IANA, or any IP address in a range reserved for private
or special usage. Actively maintained and publicly available bogon lists can be
included in a Gatekeeper policy decision program. Lists of invalid prefixes are im-
ported when the policy decision program is loaded, and they are then inserted into
a longest prefix matching (LPM) table. When requests arrive, the policy decision
program extracts the source address, performs a lookup against the bogon LPM
table, and if there is a match, the flow is declined. Source addresses can also be
checked against per-AS reputation mechanisms (Konte et al., 2015) and reputation
databases that identify known sources of cyberthreats (NERD, 2020).
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Destination IP addresses can similarly be used as the basis of a policy decision.
If there are no indications of abuse based on the source, a decision can be made
according to the characteristics of the protected host in the destination network.
Dedicated Web servers have much different characteristics than dedicated mail
servers, so network operators may find it useful to map certain hosts (destination
IP addresses) to policies on this basis, adjusting the capability’s rate limit and ex-
piration time as appropriate. Clusters of hosts that can easily be represented by
a prefix can be inserted into an LPM table for more efficient lookups. A typical
deployment may consist of dozens of such host-to-policy mappings.
An example of a policy that primarily uses source and destination IP addresses
as the basis for a decision is shown in Listing 3.1. The program looks up the source
IP address in the LPM table (which has been populated with bogon prefixes), and
if a result is found, the flow is declined. If the source address passes the check, the
destination IP is checked against two static IP addresses that represent mail and
Web servers, and although both are given granted decisions, the rate limit and ca-
pability expiration parameters differ slightly. All non-IPv4 traffic is declined. Pro-
grams also have the ability to base policy decisions on other IP header fields, such
as the Gatekeeper priority, the ECN bits (Floyd et al., 2001), or whether the packet
is fragmented. The policy example applies a declined decision with a longer-than-
usual expiration time as a punishment for fragmented packets, which are often
abusive.
Note that some code details that are extraneous to our purposes here have been
stripped away or simplified, such as endian conversion, library names, structure
names, etc. A syntactically correct example can be found in the Gatekeeper source
code (Machado et al., 2020).
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-- Static addresses of two protected hosts.
mail_server , _ = str_to_prefix("192 .0.2.1 /32")
web_server , _ = str_to_prefix("192 .0.2.2 /32")
-- IPv4 bogon list.
for line in io.lines("bogons -ipv4.txt") do
local ip_addr , prefix_len = str_to_prefix(line)
lpm_add(ip_addr , prefix_len , DECLINED)
end
function policy_lookup(pkt_info , decision)
if pkt_info.frag then return declined(decision , 600) end
if pkt_info.ip_ver == IPV4 then
local ipv4_hdr = (struct ipv4_hdr *) pkt_info.l3_hdr
decision = lpm_lookup(ipv4_hdr.src_addr)
if decision ~= nil then
-- Decision from source address LPM lookup.
return decision
end
-- Make decision based on host/service.
if ipv4_hdr.dst_addr == mail_server then
return granted(decision ,
64, -- TX rate
3600, 3000000 , 15000) -- decision expiration
end
if ipv4_hdr.dst_addr == web_server then
return granted(decision ,
512, -- TX rate
600, 540000 , 3000) -- decision expiration
end
-- Destination IP not recognized.
return declined(decision , 60)
end
-- Decline all non -IPv4 flows.
return declined(decision , 60)
Listing 3.1: A policy decision program in Lua that maps source and
destination IP addresses to decisions.
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3.4.2 Port Lookups
As another line of defense, the policy writer may find it useful to define policies
based on port numbers, which provides finer granularity for making decisions, es-
pecially for servers that host multiple services. For example, a server that hosts
both encrypted (HTTPS) and non-encrypted (HTTP) Web services can grant differ-
ent rate limits on a per-port basis. It also allows an operator to block flows that are
performing network reconnaissance, i.e. probing the destination network to see
which hosts and ports are available to try to find vulnerabilities.
An example of a simple policy decision program that maps ports to decisions
is shown in Listing 3.2. There are several elements to this policy, including:
• A lookup table that maps (IP version, destination port) combinations to pol-
icy decisions. For IPv4, a flow that is trying to access port 23 (Telnet) results
in a declined decision, whereas port 80 (HTTP) is granted for both IPv4 and
IPv6. All other ports result in a declined decision.
• A validity check that makes sure the TCP packet is not malformed, based on
its length. Malformed packets result in a declined decision for the flow.




512, -- TX rate
600, 540000 , 3000) -- decision expiration
end
function default_declined(decision)
return declined(decision , 60)
end
local simple_policy = {
[IPV4] = {
[23] = default_declined ,
[80] = default_granted ,
},
[IPV6] = {
[80] = default_granted ,
},
}
function policy_lookup(pkt_info , decision)
local l3_policy = simple_policy[pkt_info.ip_ver]
if pkt_info.l4_proto == TCP then
if pkt_info.upper_len < sizeof(struct tcp_hdr) then
return default_declined -- Malformed packet.
end
local tcphdr = (struct tcp_hdr *) pkt_info.l4_hdr)
local decision = l3_policy[tcphdr.dst_port]
if decision == nil then
return default_declined -- Port not found.
end
return decision -- Port found.
end
return default_declined -- Not a TCP packet.
Listing 3.2: A policy decision program in Lua that maps ports to
decisions.
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Since network profiles typically yield a set of valid ports for a deployment,
mapping ports to policy decisions can be a quick and simple way for operators to
define admission and rates based on application expectations, as well as decline
flows that are attempting to access invalid ports. However, since policy decisions
are made in response to requests, which represent the first packet in a flow1, an
attacker could craft a legitimate looking packet to gain a capability, only to then
use abusive traffic to launch an attack. Gatekeeper can deal with such malicious
behavior using secondary and negative bandwidth.
3.4.3 Secondary and Negative Bandwidth
Using techniques that are more sophisticated than standard admission and rate
limiting, such as applying secondary bandwidth limits and keeping track of band-
width debt for flows, requires using the BPF decision type. In the examples shown
thus far, when a flow is granted we have not differentiated between a Granted de-
cision type and a BPF decision type. The difference is that flows that are given a
Granted decision type use the forwarding and rate limiting mechanism built into
Gatekeeper servers, whereas a BPF decision type runs a BPF program that decides
whether and how to rate limit the flow. A simple example of such a BPF program
is to mimic the behavior of the built-in granted packet mechanism by rate limiting
the flow under a single bandwidth limit. In Listing 3.1 and Listing 3.2, the decision
could equivalently be either of these types.
However, BPF affords us the flexibility of doing further packet inspection to
decide how to rate limit flows. Whereas the policy decision program at Grantor
is only applied to the first packet in a flow (or upon renewal), the BPF program is
1Except in the case of capability renewal requests.
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applied to every subsequent packet in the flow. This gives Gatekeeper the oppor-
tunity to monitor flows even after a capability has been granted.
Note that evaluations for the effect of secondary and negative bandwidth are
available in Section 2.4; here, we provide more details about how to encode these
mechanisms into the policy framework.
3.4.3.1 Secondary Bandwidth
In addition to a main bandwidth limit that is applied to “normal” traffic, a BPF
program can be used to apply a secondary bandwidth limit to certain classes of
traffic. For example, a Web server would expect a majority of incoming traffic to
be over TCP. Therefore, TCP traffic in general can be rate limited at a higher limit,
while all other transport layer traffic (UDP, ICMP, ICMPv6) can be given a lower,
secondary limit that is considered more appropriate for their expected use.
The secondary bandwidth limit can also be used to stem certain classes of trans-
port and application layer attacks. For example, DNS queries could be assigned
the secondary limit based on its well-known destination port number, and there-
fore attempts to launch DNS amplification attacks will be mitigated instantly at
the Gatekeeper server by virtue of the secondary rate limiting, even as other traf-
fic continues as normal. This is ideal for situations where some small usage of a
particular application or protocol is acceptable, but overuse indicates abuse. For
example, TCP SYN packets need to generally be accepted, but can be slowed to the
secondary limit, immediately mitigating TCP synflood attacks.
Listing 3.3 shows an example BPF program that uses a secondary bandwidth
limit. As with the Lua programs, simplifications have been made to the BPF code
for its use here. See the source code for a full example (Machado et al., 2020).
91
1 web_enforcement(struct bpf_context *ctx)
2 {
3 struct packet *pkt = ctx_to_pkt(ctx);
4 if (primary_limit(ctx , pkt) == DROP_PKT)
5 return DROP_PKT; /* Primary budget exceeded. */
6









16 /* Everything below is TCP. */
17
18 if (ctx ->fragmented)
19 goto secondary_budget;
20
21 struct tcp_hdr *tcp_hdr = ...; /* Extract TCP. */
22
23 switch (tcp_hdr ->dport) {
24 case 21: /* FTP command */
25 case 80: /* HTTP */
26 case 443: /* HTTPS */
27 case 22: /* SSH */
28 if (tcp_hdr ->syn) {
29 if (tcp_hdr ->ack)
30 return DROP_PKT; /* Amplification attack. */




35 /* Accept connections originated from our web server. */
36 if (tcp_hdr ->syn && !tcp_hdr ->ack)
37 return DROP_PKT;
38 /* Authorized external services. */
39 switch (tcp_hdr ->sport) {
40 case 80: /* HTTP */














Listing 3.3: A policy enforcement program that uses secondary
bandwidth to further rate limit certain classes of transport and
application layer traffic.
92
This BPF program has several noteworthy elements:
• The primary limit is generally applied to TCP traffic and the secondary limit
is applied to ICMP traffic. Any other type of traffic is dropped.
• Fragmented traffic is given the secondary limit.
• TCP SYN ACKs sent to protected services are dropped to prevent amplifica-
tion attacks.
• TCP SYNs sent to protected services are given the secondary limit to contain
SYN flood attacks.
• The program doesn’t accept TCP SYN packets to any port except those it
explicitly knows and approves (FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, SSH).
• The program authorizes traffic from clients to the known services at the pri-
mary limit.
• The program authorizes traffic coming from Web servers at the primary limit.
This program is an exemplar of the richness that BPF program decisions afford
Gatekeeper, and helps mitigate many types of attacks that can be fingerprinted
by simply inspecting transport layer headers; see Section 2.4.4.1 for a quantitative
evaluation of how such a secondary bandwidth limit can mitigate a TCP SYN flood
attack. However, attackers can still abuse a granted capability by crafting packets
that fall under the primary bandwidth and flooding the destination network with
them. To combat this, BPF programs can also use negative bandwidth.
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3.4.3.2 Negative Bandwidth
In the classical token bucket implementation for rate limiting, when the bucket
does not have a sufficient number of tokens to forward a packet, the packet is
dropped and no tokens are removed from the bucket. However, the algorithm can
be modified to deduct a number of tokens equal to the packet length even when
there is an insufficient number of tokens and the packet is dropped. This allows
the number of tokens for the flow to become negative, forcing the source to wait in
order for packets to be forwarded. If the source continues to send faster than the
bucket refill rate, packets in the flow will be indefinitely dropped. When imple-
mented as a part of a Gatekeeper policy enforcement program, this modification
has the effect of punishing flows that try to abuse the granted channel after receiv-
ing a capability. The effect of this can be quite dramatic when under a high rate of
attack; see Section 2.4.4.2 for a quantitative evaluation of this mechanism.
Of course, even with mechanisms like secondary and negative bandwidth, ma-
licious actors will try to find new vulnerabilities and attack vectors. Applications
and transport technologies can emerge and evolve (and so can network architec-
tures (Han et al., 2012; Machado et al., 2015)), and it is therefore imperative that
Gatekeeper supports the rapid development of new policy programs.
3.4.4 New Protocol Support: QUIC
Unlike many attack detection and firewall tools, which can require a non-trivial
development, review, and publishing process to add new features, Gatekeeper can
quickly incorporate changes to policies using the flexibility of programs.
Agility in altering policy decision programs or policy enforcement programs
may be needed when new types of attacks are discovered, or as new protocols or
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applications emerge. At present, there is ongoing shift in transport mechanisms in
the Internet, as the QUIC protocol is deployed as a replacement for the traditional
HTTPS stack (Langley et al., 2017). Developed by Google to improve the perfor-
mance of HTTPS traffic, it was deployed on much of Google’s infrastructure by
early 2017, including being rolled out for all Chrome and YouTube users. In 2017,
the QUIC authors estimated that 7% of global traffic was running over QUIC, and
this proportion has likely increased in the years since, as both Facebook (Iyengar,
2018) and Uber (Mahindra et al., 2019) have adopted QUIC for their services. Addi-
tionally, deployment will probably continue to grow, as the HTTP/3 specification
decrees that the latest generation of Web traffic will utilize QUIC.
Often, new protocols yield new DDoS vulnerabilities, and QUIC is no excep-
tion. Its IETF draft specification identifies multiple vulnerabilities, including: (1)
amplification attacks, since a relatively small QUIC client hello message triggers a
large server response, which includes a TLS certificate in order to quickly perform
the TLS handshake; (2) Slowloris attacks, which attempt to keep many connections
open indefinitely using a minimum amount of activity; (3) stream commitment at-
tacks, analogous to TCP SYN floods, which attempt to exhaust per-stream state on
the server by opening many connections.
QUIC has built in some partial mitigations to its various vulnerabilities. For
example, to minimize the impact of an amplification attack, the QUIC protocol
sets a minimum size for the initial client hello message, thereby costing the attacker
significant bandwidth to transmit many fake client hello messages. However, the
server hello is still larger than the client hello, so the amplification asymmetry still
exists.
Depending on the vulnerability, Gatekeeper may be able to complement the
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mitigation techniques of the QUIC endpoint or provide entirely separate mitigat-
ing maneuvers. For example, to prevent client hellos from triggering amplification
attacks, Gatekeeper can provide an upstream enforcement point for making sure
minimum length requirements are met for client hellos, just like the QUIC server
would, without wasting path or server resources. QUIC also prohibits the use
of fragmentation at the network layer, which can also be checked by Gatekeeper.
Such minimum length and protocol validation checks could be performed policy
enforcement programs.
Additionally, to combat the protected network from being the victim of a QUIC
amplification attack, i.e., the recipient of large server handshake packets, Gate-
keeper can assign QUIC server hellos to a secondary bandwidth limit, bounding
the effectiveness of the attack.
Other types of vulnerabilities, such as stream commitment attacks, require per-
connection or per-stream state, and can only be mitigated with a significant portion
of the QUIC protocol implemented. Due to memory restrictions as well as perfor-
mance and maintainability considerations, this is not feasible in Gatekeeper.
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3.5 ADVANCED POLICY TECHNIQUES
We now describe advanced techniques for writing policies. Although the archi-
tecture is in place for these more sophisticated tools to be realized, much of what
is presented in this section serves as a jumping-off point for future research in the
Gatekeeper ecosystem, including using a distributed database to analyze traffic
at Grantor (Section 3.5.1), using port knocking for lightweight authorization (Sec-
tion 3.5.2), and load balancing and path control (Section 3.5.3).
3.5.1 Flow Capture and Analysis
3.5.1.1 Design Overview
To this point, the role of Grantor servers has been to simply make policy decisions
in response to requests and to decapsulate granted packets for their transmission
to the destination server. However, Grantor servers have much more potential that
has yet to be explored.
Due to their centralized location in the protected AS, Grantor servers acquire a
global view of all ingress traffic into the protected AS. This data could be used to
perform traffic analysis and inform policy alterations to mitigate attacks. Although
there are already many tools available for traffic aggregation and analysis (e.g.,
Cisco NetFlow (2012), Packetbeat (2020)), most tools are based in dedicated routers
and switches, require paid services, provide limited flexibility for new protocols
and attacks, give few options for remedying issues when they are found, or some
combination of all of these.
A traffic collection and analysis service that is built into Grantor servers would
be beneficial in three ways. First, there are currently no standard tools for traf-
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fic capture and analysis using DPDK network device drivers. Since Grantor uses
DPDK, this compatibility is required. Second, Grantor is best placed to perform
processing and sampling of traffic for the purposes of analysis. Since Grantor uses
hardware and software optimizations to efficiently process traffic, layering other
software on top to do further processing or sampling would likely be inefficient.
Third, ultimately the results of the traffic analysis would ideally be used as feed-
back for creating or altering network policies, which ultimately must come back
to Grantor anyway. Therefore, we decided that Grantor should sample traffic and
directly access a database that it can use in policy contexts. We chose the Redis (Re-
dis, 2020) database due to its efficient, in-memory implementation, its distributed
design to work across multiple Grantor servers, and the fact that it is open source.
3.5.1.2 Case Study: Source Address Spoofing Detection
One potential application of a Grantor distributed database is detecting a form
of source address spoofing, one of the major architectural issues that enable DDoS
attacks (Section 1.3). Attackers that use a large botnet to launch attacks may choose
to spoof source addresses in order to confuse per-flow rate control mechanisms,
such as those in Gatekeeper. It would be beneficial to identify source addresses
that are spoofed, either at policy decision or policy enforcement time, so that flows
can be declined.
Because Gatekeeper uses a distributed overlay of vantage points, it has addi-
tional path and geographic information that it can use to try to detect spoofing.
When Grantor receives an encapsulated packet from Gatekeeper, the source IP ad-
dress of the outer header is the IP address of the back interface of Gatekeeper. This
IP address uniquely identifies the vantage point in the Gatekeeper overlay. There-
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fore, Grantor can associate the source IP address of the inner header, the client’s
IP address, with the vantage point through which it came. Figure 3.1 gives an
overview of the association of flows to vantage points.
Figure 3.1: Example geographic overview of flows associated to VPs.
Given the static nature of deployments, the mapping of source network to its
anycast-closest VP will be fairly static as well. This property allows Grantor to
detect anomalous behavior whenever it receives packets from a client’s source IP
address that do not match the VP that was seen in a previous sample. An example
of such a policy at work can be seen in Listing 3.4.
A caveat to this technique is that it gives attackers a potential handle for deny-
ing service to other flows. An attacker with a priori knowledge of the source ad-
dress and assigned VP of a legitimate client could preemptively spoof that source
address, so that requests from the legitimate client are declined by Grantor.
Because the test is not guaranteed to be accurate and could result in collateral
damage to legitimate clients, this technique could be used as supplemental infor-
mation to decide which rate to allot a flow, or could be used to de-prioritize flows
that appear to have a spoofed source IP when Gatekeeper is overwhelmed by an
attack. We leave a more thorough examination of the advantages and potential pit-
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falls of such a source address spoofing detection, as well as other techniques that
leverage geographical VP information, to future work.
function vp_changed(pkt_info)
-- Get GK server 's IP address.
local outer_hdr = (struct ipv4_hdr *) pkt_info.outer_hdr
local gk_src = tostring(outer_hdr.src_addr)
-- Get client 's IP address.
local inner_hdr = (struct ipv4_hdr *) pkt_info.inner_hdr
local cli_src = tostring(inner_hdr.src_addr)
prev_gk_src = redis_db.get(cli_src)
if prev_gk_src == nil then




-- Return whether the Gatekeeper address is consistent.
return prev_gk_src ~= gk_src
end
function lookup_policy(pkt_info , policy)
-- Check whether the source address might be spoofed.
if vp_changed(pkt_info) then
-- Decline for 60s.
return declined(policy , 60)
end
return default_granted(policy)
Listing 3.4: A policy decision program that detects changes in the
mapping of client IP to VP, and declines flows whose VP changes.
3.5.1.3 Traffic Analysis with Machine Learning
Once the ability to sample, store, and analyze traffic data is established, statisti-
cal techniques and machine learning can be applied to detect network anomalies,
which can be used to inform Gatekeeper policies.
100
Although the threat model for Gatekeeper is mostly concerned with infrastruc-
ture layer attacks, there do exist classes of attacks that use low-rate, benign-looking
traffic to target vulnerabilities in protocol or application implementations. There
is a significant body of work in network anomaly detection (Garcia-Teodoro et al.,
2009) and intrusion detection via machine learning (Buczak & Guven, 2015) to pick
up on such low and slow attacks. Given the ability of Gatekeeper to craft policies
that inspect protocol header data, principal component analysis techniques can be
used to mine network anomalies and report which traffic features are responsible
for the anomaly (Lakhina et al., 2005). The resulting analysis could be used in an
offline process to construct Gatekeeper policies, or perhaps in an online process to
make adjustments to rate limits, for example.
In general, Grantor can be used as an insertion point for network analysis tools,
such as attack detection research or industry tools for traffic analysis.
3.5.2 Port Knocking
The ideal scenario for a network capability system is for clients to be authorized
for transmission a priori, before packets are put on the wire, so that the capability
system can simply authenticate the client and verify its capability. Clearly, this
sort of planning is not always feasible, since out-of-band capability distribution
mechanisms are not convenient or easy to implement, not every interaction on the
Internet is planned in advance, and it may not even be prescribed in the interaction
model of the service to require pre-authorization of users.
Still, there is clearly a time and a place for such mechanisms. TLS client cer-
tificates, for example, allow servers to cryptographically authenticate clients based
on a distributed digital certificate. Although the possession of a TLS client certifi-
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cate does not imply that the client should be able to send at an arbitrary rate, it
represents a form of authorization and can be the first step in a defense-in-depth
strategy with multiple layers of protection.
For performance reasons, Gatekeeper servers are not currently equipped to per-
form TLS client authentication, although there is no technical reason why they
could not do so. However, more lightweight forms of authorization, such as port
knocking (Degraaf et al., 2005), are compatible with Gatekeeper. Port knocking tra-
ditionally refers to a technique that allows clients to open ports on a firewall by
generating a specific sequence of connection attempts against particular ports. By
default, ports protected by the port knocking mechanism appear closed. However,
if a client generates a correct “knock,” i.e., sequence of ports, then the firewall is
opened for the client, allowing it to access services at valid ports.
In Gatekeeper’s case, the Gatekeeper server itself represents the firewall. For
each flow, a BPF program can be parameterized with a knock sequence, and state
can be kept regarding the client’s knocking progress using a simple counter. If
the client completes the knock sequence, then their traffic is assigned the primary
bandwidth of the link. Otherwise, the client’s traffic is assigned the secondary
bandwidth or dropped. An example is shown in Listing 3.5.
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1 port_knocking(struct gk_bpf_pkt_ctx *ctx)
2 {
3 struct state *state = (struct state *) pkt_ctx_to_cookie(ctx);
4 struct packet *pkt = ctx_to_pkt(ctx);
5
6 if (primary_limit(ctx , pkt) == DROP_PKT)
7 return DROP_PKT; /* Primary budget exceeded. */
8
9 if (state ->correct_knocks == NUM_PORT_KNOCKS)
10 goto forward; /* Client already successfully port knocked. */
11
12 if (ctx ->l4_proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
13 goto secondary; /* Can only knock using TCP. */
14
15 if (pkt ->l4_len < sizeof (* tcp_hdr))
16 return DROP_PKT; /* Malformed TCP header. */
17
18 struct tcphdr *tcp_hdr = (struct tcphdr *)(pkt + offset)
19 uint16_t knocked_port = tcp_hdr ->d_port;
20
21 /* Check whether this knock matches the next in the sequence. */
22 if (knocked_port == state ->ports[state ->correct_knocks ])
23 state ->correct_knocks ++;
24 else
25 state ->correct_knocks = 0;
26
27 if (state ->correct_knocks == NUM_PORT_KNOCKS)
28 goto forward; /* This was the last knock needed. */
29
30 secondary:





Listing 3.5: A policy enforcement program that uses port knocking
to decide whether a flow should be assigned a primary or secondary
bandwidth.
3.5.3 Load Balancing and Path Control
Policy enforcement programs can also be used to load balance flows to desti-
nation servers, either using encapsulation or direct delivery, instead of sending
granted traffic through Grantor. This increases the robustness and performance
of the protected network’s services, while removing the need for dedicated load
balancers. Since the load balancing is performed from VPs, Gatekeeper there-
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fore becomes a scalable, geographically-distributed, DDoS-protected, centrally-
administrated load balancer.
With the ability to perform encapsulation to an arbitrary destination in the pro-
tected network, Gatekeeper could also redirect flows. Flow redirection opens Gate-
keeper up to new possibilities, such as integrating with intrusion detection systems
or utilizing path control, which could be used to forward flows around congested
links [or attacked links (Section 4.4)]. Combined with the fact that policies control
(1) which flows are redirected, (2) the conditions under which they are redirected,
and (3) the redirection destination, this technique could also be seen as a form of
on-demand tunneling.
Overall, the richness of Gatekeeper policy decision and enforcement programs
provides many opportunities for expressive control over the network capability
system. We expect that the techniques previewed in this section will mature into
tools that network operators can use in their deployments.
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CHAPTER 4
Defending Against Next-Generation Attacks
4.1 OVERVIEW
We now turn to the future, and consider where malicious actors might take the
DDoS field of play next. For the past two decades, attackers have been steadily
increasing the effectiveness of their attacks along three axes: the magnitude of at-
tacks, the frequency of attacks, and the sophistication of attacks (Arbor Networks,
2014; NETSCOUT, 2019; Neustar, 2020; AWS, 2020b). The trends are clear, and
show no signs of slowing down. So how have attackers achieved this?
We can look to the state-of-the-art DDoS attack techniques for an answer, and
perhaps no attack has greater exemplified the trends than Mirai (Antonakakis et al.,
2017). The Mirai attack co-opts various IoT devices around the Internet, including
cameras, DVRs, and routers, and uses them to infect more devices and launch a
variety of attacks. Many of these devices are computation- and bandwidth-limited,
and may reside in regions with low bandwidth capacity (Antonakakis et al., 2017).
Despite these limitations, Mirai attacks have reached peak capacities of over 1.2
Tbps, and have targeted (and successfully brought down) entities that provide
global DNS and cloud services, affecting large swaths of the Internet.
Still, Mirai-like attacks have not reached their full potential. This is because Mi-
rai typically uses well-known TCP exhaustion and application layer attacks, which
can be detected and mitigated using signature-based mechanisms. In one analy-
sis (Antonakakis et al., 2017), 70% of the attack traffic was from non-infrastructure
layer attacks. But not all attacks are like this. Consider the Crossfire attack (Kang
et al., 2013). First described in 2013, Crossfire combines many of the properties of
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Mirai with stealth. Crossfire uses low-rate, legitimate-looking traffic to launch a
clandestine attack upon its victim, upping the ante in terms of attack sophistica-
tion.
Looking ahead, the network landscape is shifting in a direction that favors at-
tacks like Mirai and Crossfire. New developments in the realms of user devices,
access networks, and protocols are likely to further advantage attackers, and de-
fensive solutions will desperately be needed.
In this chapter, we consider why Gatekeeper can be such a solution. In Sec-
tion 4.2, we provide a primer on the Crossfire attack, which we have chosen to
study as an example for two reasons. First, it it is especially relevant to this the-
sis because it enjoys architectural advantages over defensive systems. Second, the
outlook for the growth of Crossfire attacks in the foreseeable future should worry
network operators. We discuss this outlook in Section 4.3, where we describe the
possibility of a perfect storm of factors – the proliferation of IoT devices, 5G net-
works, and IPv6 infrastructure – that could lead to highly disruptive Crossfire at-
tacks. We then propose that Gatekeeper, with its architecturally-minded approach,
is capable of mitigating or severely limiting the effectiveness of Crossfire attacks,




Crossfire is a form of link flooding attack (LFA), i.e., an attack which seeks to deny
service to legitimate clients by overwhelming one or more links in the network, as
opposed to overwhelming only the network connection, CPU, or memory capac-
ity of a target server directly. Crossfire was first described by Kang et al. (2013),
which has led to a small but significant body of work about LFAs in general, in-
cluding Kang et al. (2016); Lee et al. (2013); Smith & Schuchard (2018); Tran et al.
(2019).
Although the locus of the attack is a set of one or more links, the victim of
the attack is a target area, a geographic region which could be as small as a network
enclave within an organization and as large as a country. As examples, target areas
could be an individual university or the entire East coast of the United States.
To cut off service to a target area, the adversary seeks to find a set of target links
that are geographically close to the target area. The adversary carefully chooses
target links based on measurements that determine which of the relevant links
likely carry a large share of the traffic to the target area. Therefore, launching a
DDoS attack against this set of target links cuts off a target area from legitimate
traffic.
An overview of the Crossfire attack is shown in Figure 4.1, and the relevant
components for attack construction are summarized in Table 4.1. In order to calcu-
late the set of target links, the adversary finds a set of public servers in the target
area as well as a set of decoy servers in the vicinity of the target area. We call this
set of public and decoy servers D. The adversary then selects a set of bots, B, and
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sends multiple traceroute probes from every b ∈ B to every d ∈ D. The result of
these probes is a set of paths P , each of which is composed of links drawn from all
encountered links, L. The adversary then extracts the persistent links L′ ⊂ L from
these paths, i.e., those that always occur in the traceroute output across multiple
trials for each pair (b, d). The set L′ composes a network-layer link map (grey links
in Figure 4.1), which represents the set of candidate links from which the target
links will be chosen.
Figure 4.1: An overview of the Crossfire attack, illustrating the bots,
target area, decoy servers, and target links. Based on diagram origi-
nally from Kang et al. (2013).
To select the target links, the adversary analyzes the map to find the links that
would be most useful to flood with an attack. The metric used by the adversary is
the flow density for each link l ∈ L′, which is defined as the number of paths p ∈ P
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that cross l. Links with a high flow density are likely to carry the highest amount
of legitimate traffic, and are therefore are the highest value links for an attacker to
flood.
After selecting the set of target links T ⊂ L′, the adversary gives instructions
to each bot, consisting of the set of decoy servers the bot should send to, as well
as the rate at which it should send to each server. Bots use low-rate, legitimate-
looking traffic that is destined for real, public servers, so that no individual flow
looks out of the ordinary, but in aggregate the bots are coordinated in such a way
that the target links are flooded. To circumvent defensive strategies and maintain
attack persistence, the adversary can periodically rotate the set of target links that
the bots flood, and/or rotate the set of bots performing the flooding.
Symbol Definition
B The set of bots
D The set of public and decoy servers
P The set of paths output by traceroute for all (b ∈ B, d ∈ D) pairs
L The set of links that compose paths p ∈ P
L′ The set of persistent links; subset of L; candidates for target links
T The set of target links; subset of L′
Table 4.1: Summary of the components of the Crossfire attack con-
struction.
The result is an attack that is exceptionally difficult to detect. Since link at-
tacks like Crossfire cut off traffic at intermediate links in the client-server paths,
the attack traffic does not reach the server itself, and therefore signature-based
detection mechanisms that analyze traffic are not useful. Middleware appliances
such as intrusion detection systems (IDS) that are placed further up the path may
process some of the attack traffic, but only if some of the target links are cho-
sen to be between the IDS and the public servers. Even then, other target links
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may not be in that range. Furthermore, since the attack traffic uses low-rate flows
with legitimate-looking traffic to legitimate destinations, the IDS is unlikely to flag
traffic from Crossfire bots as anomalous. Automatic link failure detection mecha-
nisms, such as those built into OSPF and BGP, are too slow to react to target link
set changes that the adversary can perform.
Even if a victim could recognize that an attack was occurring, there is no mech-
anism for networks to protect themselves if the target links are outside of the ad-
ministrative control of the network operator. A principal conclusion of Kang et al.
(2013) is that coordination between networks is necessary to mitigate an attack if
target links reside in different domains. These properties show that Crossfire takes
advantage of the architectural issues that enable DDoS attacks, as we describe next.
4.2.2 Architectural Advantages of Crossfire
Crossfire is an interesting case study, as it relates to the architectural aspects of
DDoS, as it enjoys several architectural advantages over defensive systems and
exacerbates the architectural issues described in Section 1.3.
Inability to mitigate at attack locus (relates to Architectural Issue 1). Since
the links used to cut off a target area can be outside of the target area’s network,
mitigation of the attack has to happen upstream, by another provider. Allowing a
victim network to request mitigation from another network would require crossing
management and trust boundaries, which is unlikely to happen in the near future
given the decentralized operation of the Internet.
Seemingly benign nature of attack traffic (relates to Architectural Issue 2).
Typically, attack traffic is unwanted, which provides at least a starting point for at-
tack detection and fingerprinting mechanisms to distinguish it from traffic that is
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legitimate. However, the nature of the attack traffic in Crossfire is more nuanced:
it is unwanted in the sense that it is not deriving any real benefit for the client
or server, and is dealing damage to the victim network. However, it is “wanted”
in the sense that Crossfire uses seemingly legitimate traffic – valid uses of appli-
cations and protocols at appropriate rates – between real clients and servers, and
therefore is indistinguishable from actual legitimate traffic. In this way, Cross-
fire exacerbates Architectural Issue 2 (there is no mechanism to stop unwanted traffic),
since stopping unwanted traffic is predicated on being able to discern which traffic
is unwanted.
No source spoofing required (relates to Architectural Issue 3). Since Crossfire
uses legitimate-looking traffic, such as Web requests, it does not need to spoof
source IP addresses. However, since the victim network does not necessarily have
visibility into the attack traffic, the lack of source spoofing is not an additional
advantage for the attacker beyond the appearance of legitimate traffic.
Widespread distribution of bots. (Relates to Architectural Issue 4). Similar
to most DDoS attacks, Crossfire can be achieved using a distribution of bots from
around the Internet. However, this is notably different from a closely related form
of link attack, Coremelt (Studer & Perrig, 2009), where attack traffic is directly be-
tween bots and therefore the selection and utility of the attack locus is subject to
the bot distribution.
Given these advantages, it is unsurprising that Crossfire attacks have made the
leap from being theorized about in academic papers to hitting real-world infras-
tructure.
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4.2.3 Recorded Crossfire Attacks
Malicious actors have already launched attacks similar to Crossfire in the Internet.
In 2013, the anti-junk e-mail company Spamhaus was the victim of a massive (300
Gbps) DDoS attack. The locus of the attack was the links in the Internet exchange
where Spamhaus traffic crossed on its way to Cloudflare, who provided DDoS
protection services to Spamhaus (Prince, 2013; Bright, 2013). The attackers were
able to find the IP addresses of peers in the IXP, and used those IP addresses to
oversaturate some of the IXP links, leading to a successful attack. The Spamhaus
attack used DNS amplification to obtain a high attack rate, so it did not quite use
the legitimate-looking flows of traditional Crossfire, but it did focus its attack on
upstream links, outside of where Spamhaus or Cloudflare could immediately see.
Two years later, in 2015, ProtonMail was the target of a week-long 50 Gbps
attack (Patternson, 2015). The attackers set their sights on the links in the upstream
ISPs that connected to the ProtonMail datacenters, and attacking them brought the
datacenters offline. ProtonMail CEO Andy Yen described the event in stark terms:
“We realized we were dealing with a different, far more scary attacker. One that
didn’t fit the pattern of any previous attack.” It was only through the combined
efforts of transit providers and other companies that ProtonMail was able to restore
service.
These incidents demonstrate that large-scale link attacks are not only feasible,
but can be very damaging in practice. However, there are not currently any com-
prehensive and deployable solutions to combat link attacks, as we describe next.
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4.2.4 Previous Attempts at a Solution
Multiple partial solutions to link flooding attacks have been proposed. For exam-
ple, CoDef (Lee et al., 2013) proposes collaborative rerouting, which permits victim
networks to send “reroute” requests to source networks, asking them to use detour
paths around congested routers or links. However, CoDef assumes the presence
of a path identifier mechanism and inter-domain collaboration, both of which are
not available in the current Internet architecture. SPIFFY (Kang et al., 2016) pro-
poses to use mechanisms to increase the bandwidth of target links and observe
the resulting traffic response, forcing attackers to either increase their attack cost
or allow themselves to be differentiated from legitimate traffic. However, this so-
lution assumes that the target links are within the jurisdiction of the deploying
network. RADAR (Zheng et al., 2018) shows that an SDN-based approach can be
used to detect and rate-limit link flooding attacks within a single network, but is
not generalizable across networks.
For attack detection, LinkScope (Xue et al., 2014) proposes new end-to-end and
hop-by-hop measurement techniques to detect LFAs, but does not provide a miti-
gation solution.
As a proactive defense, NetHide (Meier et al., 2018) proposes techniques for
hiding the internal topology of a network to make the reconnaissance phase of link
attacks difficult, but faces deployment hurdles in requiring the programmability of
routers and does not provide a mitigation technique for target links that are able
to be identified.
STRIDE (Hsiao et al., 2013) and SIBRA (Basescu et al., 2016) aim to use band-
width isolation and reservation mechanisms to guarantee a minimum level of ser-
vice for critical flows. While promising in their ability to combat DDoS attacks,
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these proposals are not feasible in the current Internet architecture and would
work best in novel network architectures such as SCION (Zhang et al., 2011).
Most recently, Nyx (Smith & Schuchard, 2018) proposes to use BGP poisoning
to achieve isolation of traffic and route around congested links, obviating the need
for trying to filter or throttle DDoS attacks. However, in response, Tran et al. (2019)
suggested that the techniques used in Smith & Schuchard (2018) are not feasible in
practice due to limitations in the implementations of BGP, and showed that adap-
tive adversaries can find new paths for its attacks.
The main problem with this body of work is that it consists of partial solutions
and solutions that would require significant and expensive changes to the Internet
architecture to deploy. Unfortunately, as we describe next, link flooding attacks
may soon become more commonplace in the Internet, accelerating the need for a
comprehensive and deployable solution.
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4.3 THE PERFECT STORM
The ecosystem of the Internet’s infrastructure and connected devices may soon be
changing in a way that makes Crossfire attacks even more feasible for attackers to
launch. There are at least three recent developments that could provide new attack
opportunities.
The proliferation of IoT devices. Recent years have seen the development of
cheap and simple ways of constructing botnets composed of IoT devices. Although
IoT botnets existed before 2016, that year saw the introduction of the Mirai botnet,
which (along with its derivatives) has become the foremost example. The original
Mirai botnet reached a population of 200,000-300,000 bots, but it is estimated that
at least around 20 million such devices exist in the Internet as of 2020 (Guo &
Heidemann, 2020). The number of devices will continue to grow, and the diversity
of these devices will continue to grow, which makes finding and patching security
vulnerabilities like those exploited by Mirai quite difficult.
Such a wealth of potential bots is especially useful for Crossfire, since IoT de-
vices are distributed throughout the world, providing a diverse snapshot of paths
that lead to a target area. Further, the modest network capacity of IoT devices is
well-suited for Crossfire, since it can achieve successful attacks using just a few
Kbps (Kang et al., 2013).
The introduction of 5G networks. The rollout of the fifth generation of mobile
networks has begun across the world (Xu et al., 2020). 5G networks will provide
higher bit-rates, lower latencies, and greater reliability, enabling many real-time
and virtual applications. The 5G was built in part to support features for IoT, such
as systems for slicing virtualization and infrastructure and access technologies for
the massive density of traffic between IoT devices (3GPP Org., 2019).
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Although Crossfire may not fully utilize the bandwidth increases enabled by
5G networks (since it uses low-rate flows to its advantage), the new network sup-
port for billions of new devices provides Crossfire with the infrastructure needed
to leverage the billions of new potential bots at its disposal.
The deployment of IPv6. Although support for IPv6 began to roll out in the
late 1990s, adoption did not significantly pick up steam until around 2009 (Czyz
et al., 2014a), and there has been a steady increase in adoption since then. By
the numbers: 30% of Google’s users access their services using IPv6 as of 2020,
and has been increasingly approximately 5% per year since 2014 (Google, 2020a).
IPv6 usage in IXPs is on an upward trend as well: IX.br has measured peak IPv6
throughput at over 500 Gbps (IX.br, 2020), and 5-10% of the average traffic passing
through SeattleIX is IPv6, with a peak around 16% (SeattleIX, 2020). In terms of
adoption by network, mobile carriers and telecoms are generally leading the way,
with India-based Reliance Jio at 90% IPv6 deployment among its users, and all
combined US carriers at 86% (World IPv6 Launch, 2020).
IPv6 brings many technical strengths to the Internet landscape, but burgeon-
ing deployments also present weaknesses. Rapidly rising deployment rates in
both content networks and eyeball networks across the globe, especially mobile
providers, are driving up rates of IPv6 traffic, but management tools, hardware,
and native deployments (“IPv6 only”) of links and services may not be adequately
provisioned. Network configuration tools as well as DDoS detection and mitiga-
tion tools have had more time, resources, and events to be refined, and IPv6 will
have its own unique challenges. For example, state exhaustion attacks may be-
come more prevalent due to the expanded address space of IPv6.
Anecdotally, in our implementation of Gatekeeper, we found both hardware
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and software support for filters for IPv6 traffic to be more limited. In our conversa-
tions with network operators, we found that networks are incrementally shifting
parts of their services and infrastructure to IPv6 to test the waters before larger
deployments are realized. Such partial migrations may leave parts of their infras-
tructure underprovisioned or otherwise not ready to face an IPv6-based attack.
In summary, the combination of the emergence of IoT devices, 5G networks,
and IPv6 presents a scenario where the number of devices and their aggregate
capacity is rapidly increasing, while the underlying network infrastructure is si-
multaneously undergoing a radical shift. Such a confluence of factors may lead to
a perfect storm of conditions for large scale link attacks like Crossfire to become
commonplace.
As the Internet hurdles toward this next generation, there are no deployable,
comprehensive defensive strategies for combating Crossfire-like attacks. However,
there may be hope: architectural approaches to mitigation, such as Gatekeeper,
may provide the techniques needed to defend against large-scale link attacks.
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4.4 CROSSFIRE DEFENSE WITH GATEKEEPER
Recall that a Crossfire attack consists of three phases: constructing the link map,
coordinating bots to flood target links, and periodically rotating the set of target
links to maintain attack persistence. Gatekeeper offers strategies for combating
attackers at each of these phases.
Crucially, some of these strategies depend on the ability of Gatekeeper to be
deployed in cloud environments. Clouds offer an advantage to Gatekeeper in two
ways. First, due to the massive infrastructure investment of large cloud providers,
e.g., Amazon, Microsoft, and Google, significant portions of cloud paths are in-
dependent from, and more reliable than, public Internet paths, to the extent that
such paths have been proposed to improve the quality of service of many appli-
cations (Haq et al., 2017, 2020). Gatekeeper leverages the independent nature of
these paths to circumvent links that are targeted by adversaries, or else require
that Crossfire botnets are composed of cloud VMs. Second, due to the flexibility of
deployment in the cloud, Gatekeeper VPs can be quickly bootstrapped, analyzed
for their topological characteristics, and put into service during an attack. Because
of these advantages, some of the strategies discussed next may or may not be ap-
plicable when Gatekeeper is deployed in other environments, such as IXPs.
To support our findings, we employed a real-world measurement study that
emulates the attack setup of a Crossfire adversary, the details of which are pre-
sented in Section 4.4.1. Then, we show the advantages that Gatekeeper has over
Crossfire attacks. First, Gatekeeper can disrupt the attacker’s ability to construct a
useful link map (Section 4.4.2). When an attacker floods links, many Gatekeeper
paths may not cross any of the target links chosen from the link map, even when
rotating sets of links are used (Section 4.4.3). Finally, even when an attack is suc-
118
cessful, Gatekeeper can use a moving target defense to reduce the likelihood of
legitimate traffic crossing saturated links (Section 4.4.4).
Note that we do not quantitatively compare our results to the previous attempts
at Crossfire solutions (Section 4.2), as the measurement study simply evaluates
the feasibility of the proposed Gatekeeper defense. Additionally, since all of the
previous attempts at solutions are either (1) partial solutions with much different
assumptions (e.g., the ability to collaborate between networks), or (2) not feasible
in the current architecture, a direct comparison is not practical.
4.4.1 Measurement Study Setup
In order to evaluate how Gatekeeper can respond to a a Crossfire attack, we needed
to emulate the steps that an actual attacker would perform, as described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Although for ethical and practical reasons we did not launch a large-
scale link attack, we developed the Crossfire link map construction algorithm as
described in Kang et al. (2013), which includes algorithms to extract a set of persis-
tent links from traceroute results, find target links with high flow densities, and
pick sets of target links to use in rotating attacks to maintain attack persistence.
For a target area, we selected a geographic region that approximately corre-
sponds to the city of Boston, Massachusetts, USA. Notably, Boston is home to many
higher education institutions, as well as medical, biotechnology, and general high
technology and innovation industries, making it a well-connected region in terms
of network infrastructure as well as technological importance. The results of the
study may or may not apply to regions with poorer connectivity properties.
We also selected approximately 100 Looking Glass nodes using the CAIDA
Periscope (Giotsas et al., 2016) as a proxy for the Crossfire botnet. These nodes are
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distributed across the world, and are available for public use to run traceroute for
Internet measurement purposes. We limited our botnet to the 100 nodes with the
consistently highest link persistence on the path from each bot to the target area.
However, to increase the geographic distribution of bots, we limited our set to at
most one bot per city.
To compose our set of decoy servers, we found approximately 60 public servers
in the networks of institutions around the target area. Although Kang et al. (2013)
recommend finding such decoy servers through “port-scanning,” we took a multi-
step approach:
1. Perform subdomain enumeration to find publicly accessible subdomains from
institutions around the target area. To avoid selecting decoy servers that are
not physically near the target area, such as for subdomains that resolve to
cloud services, cross-referencing should be performed with multiple tools to
estimate the approximate geographic location of each IP.
2. For each IP address corresponding to a subdomain, perform a traceroute to
that IP address in order to test whether probes are administratively blocked
by the network.
3. If traceroute probes succeed, then look for other servers in the same net-
work, since there may be other servers that are publicly accessible but do not
have DNS entries. To find these servers, we use nmap (Lyon, 2009) against the
/24 network prefix of the IP address found as a guess of what other servers
may exist with the same administrative policies.
4. Run traceroute to each of the servers found by nmap to verify that they can
be probed.
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The target area, bots, and decoy servers are sufficient for the Crossfire setup
and attack. However, to evaluate the effect of Gatekeeper defensive strategies,
we simulate a Gatekeeper deployment using cloud nodes in AWS to represent 6
geographically distributed vantage points, in Ohio (US), Frankfurt (EU-1), Paris
(EU-2), Sydney (AU), Mumbai (IN), and São Paulo (BR). We refer to these VPs as
the set V , We chose nodes in these regions to simulate a global Gatekeeper deploy-
ment, but also chose two VPs in Europe (Frankfurt and Paris) to be able to compare
the value of VPs that are geographically close.
Note that in this evaluation, Gatekeeper is not actually deployed. We simply
use representative vantage point locations to determine what Gatekeeper’s effect
would be on the topological assumptions and advantages of Crossfire, were Gate-
keeper actually deployed there.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Looking Glass nodes for bots (blue pins)
and simulated Gatekeeper vantage points (yellow icons).
An overview of the distribution of bots and VPs is shown in Figure 4.2. With
this setup, we then evaluated how Gatekeeper can defend against Crossfire attacks
during the link map construction, link flooding, and attack rotation phases. We
discuss Gatekeeper’s defense to each of the phases next.
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4.4.2 Link Map Disruption
In constructing Crossfire link maps, adversaries may use traceroute results that
are from bots to servers protected by Gatekeeper. This can occur either when the
Gatekeeper-protected AS is in the target area, or when the Gatekeeper-protected
AS can be used for decoy servers around a target area. If the adversary knows that
certain servers are protected by Gatekeeper, either because such information is
public or through path analysis, then they might choose to specifically avoid those
servers if there are a sufficient number of other decoy servers available. However,
if these paths are included in the link map construction, then the utility of the result
may be diminished in terms of candidate target links for the following reasons.
The effect of encapsulation. Since traffic between Gatekeeper and Grantor is
encapsulated, the attacker has no visibility into that section of the path. This is due
to the way that traceroute is typically implemented: using probes with incremen-
tally increasing time-to-live (TTL) values, causing routers who see TTL values of
0 to return ICMP Time Exceeded messages back to the source. This sequence of
messages allows senders to piece together the path to the destination. However,
between Gatekeeper and Grantor, the IP header with this crafted TTL value is sub-
merged in another IP header, so routers do not inspect it and therefore do not send
the ICMP messages to the sender. Additionally, Gatekeeper and Grantor servers
at the ends of the tunnel do not inspect this value, and Grantor is expected to be
deployed on the same network segment as the ultimate destination. Therefore, af-
ter the last hop before Gatekeeper, the only hop along the path that will reply to
the probe is the destination server (Figure 4.3). This obscures the adversary’s view
into the links around the target area. Since this is an area where potentially many
paths converge, the pool of candidate target links may be reduced.
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Figure 4.3: Handling of traceroute probes around the Gatekeeper to
Grantor tunnel.
The effect of anycast. In a Gatekeeper deployment, the only links that are
visible to the adversary’s traceroute bots are the links leading up to the VP. These
links have indeed been targeted by large-scale link attacks in the past (Prince, 2013;
Bright, 2013). However, in that attack, the IP address of the router inside of the IXP
was exposed, and therefore the adversary could use all of its bots to target the links
leading up that router as a part of the flood. Since traffic destined for Gatekeeper-
protected ASes are anycast to the topologically nearest VP, the adversary’s pool of
bots is divided, limiting the bots that could attack a given VP to those that are geo-
graphically close. We could not measure this effect in our study, since dividing our
pool of bots among the VPs would create some sample sizes that were too small
to be relevant, especially for VPs that had only a few bots (e.g., Australia). Even if
the pool of bots were large enough to saturate a critical mass of links leading to a
VP, that is only one entry point for Gatekeeper traffic. Traffic that uses other VPs
in a global deployment would be unaffected.
The effect of policies. Some Gatekeeper deployments may choose to lever-
age the ability of Gatekeeper to deliver granted packets directly to destinations,
instead of first through Grantor servers (Section 2.2.3). In this case, encapsulation
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is not used along the Gatekeeper-Grantor channel. However, Gatekeeper policies
can be formed to administratively prohibit traceroute along this path. Although
there is no definitive signature of traceroute packets, which are typically either be
UDP or ICMP datagrams, there are heuristics that can be used. For example, they
typically have low TTL values in order to trigger responses from routers. A sam-
ple policy decision program in Lua that captures packets likely to be traceroute
and declines the flow is shown in Listing 4.1. A similar technique could be used in
policy enforcement programs for flows that have already been granted.
local function policy_lookup(pkt_info)
if pkt_info.l4_proto == policylib.c.ICMP then
-- Snip: extract IPv4 header and ICMP type/code.
-- Disable traceroute through ICMP into network.
if ipv4_hdr.time_to_live < 16 and
icmp_type == ICMP_ECHO_REQUEST_TYPE and





Listing 4.1: A policy decision program in Lua that declines flows that
appear to use traceroute.
The defenses discussed so far only relate to adversaries that try to use servers
protected by Gatekeeper as part of the link map construction. But this is not nec-
essarily the case. Adversaries may attempt to victimize a Gatekeeper-protected
network by building a link map using decoy servers that are known to be geo-
graphically close to the victim network. We discuss this scenario next.
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4.4.3 Diversity of Cloud Paths From Gatekeeper
Crossfire does not rely solely on servers in the target area to perform the link map
construction. If an attacker knew that Gatekeeper was protecting a target network,
then it could construct the link map solely using decoy servers in unprotected
networks, with the assumption that the target links would overlap with links in the
paths from Gatekeeper VPs to the target area. However, even if an attacker takes
this approach, the effectiveness of this link map is limited due to the topological
differences of Gatekeeper paths, at least when Gatekeeper is deployed in a cloud.
To measure this effect, we analyzed the results of the study described in Sec-
tion 4.4.1. We used the results to construct a link map (|L′| = 843), and picked a
set of target links according to the attack construction described in Section 4.2. Fig-
ure 4.4 shows the persistent links ranked by flow density, and highlights the target
links that were chosen, where |T | = 20.
Figure 4.4: The target links T chosen from the set of persistent links
found in the measurement study, where |T | = 20.
To investigate whether Gatekeeper would enable client traffic to circumvent
these target links, we then ran traceroute probes from our set V of vantage points
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in AWS to a sample of the target area servers. We then compared the v ∈ V to d ∈ D
paths to check whether they crossed the target links constructed by the Crossfire
attack. Our four main findings are:
1. The number of paths that cross target links when directed through a Gate-
keeper VP is much fewer than the number of paths that cross target links
when forwarded directly to the target area.
2. Even if Gatekeeper paths cross target links, they are not necessarily crossing
the links with the highest flow density, so attackers would need to flood more
links in order to maintain an effective attack, raising attack cost.
3. Findings (1) and (2) are true for both a static attack of 20 target links and a
rolling attack of three sets of 10 target links.
4. Moving target-based defenses could be effective due to the marginal path
diversity obtained from different VPs.
We now elaborate on these findings.
Cloud paths from Gatekeeper cross fewer target links. We use the degradation
ratio (Kang et al., 2013) to measure the effectiveness of a set of target links in cap-
turing traffic to the target area. For a given number of target links, the degradation
ratio is the proportion of paths that cross target links (the set PT ) to the overall
set of paths P : |PT ||P | . In other words, it is the fraction of the paths to a target area
that can expect to run into at least one saturated, targeted link during an attack. A
successful attack will create a high degradation ratio.
Figure 4.5 shows the degradation ratios from our measurement study for dif-
ferent sizes of T , from 1 ≤ |T | ≤ 50. The No VP series represents the degradation
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ratios for the traditional Crossfire attack, without any VPs. In general, only a small
set T is needed to force most paths through a target link: 75% of paths to the target
area cross a target link when |T | = 10. This result is consistent with Kang et al.
(2013).
Figure 4.5: The degradation ratios when paths are forwarded di-
rectly to a target area and forwarded through VPs.
Figure 4.5 also shows the degradation ratios for all (v, d) paths, from each VP to
the decoy servers in the target area. This result emulates a Gatekeeper defense, in
which all client traffic is funneled through a vantage point before being sent to the
target area. We found that the degradation ratios for paths from VPs are mostly
less than what they would be if forwarded directly to the target area, in some cases
considerably so. This means that client traffic forwarded through Gatekeeper in a
cloud deployment would largely not cross target links.
For example, no paths from the US (Ohio) or the IN (Mumbai) VPs crossed any
target links. Only one path from AU (Sydney) crossed a target link. The EU (Paris)
and BR (São Paulo) VPs saw the most overlap with target links: over 60% of paths
in both cases. However, we must also consider which links are being crossed by
such paths.
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Target links in cloud paths from Gatekeeper are not necessarily high-value
links. For an adversary, it is desirable to minimize the number of target links
used to launch an attack. More target links can require more bots to make the at-
tack successful, since Crossfire attacks use low-intensity flows to maintain attack
persistence. However, when Gatekeeper paths cross target links, they are not nec-
essarily high value links in terms of flow density.
To visualize this, we can drill down into the case where the number of target
links is 20. At that level of attack, we can view which target links the VP-to-target
area paths are crossing in Figure 4.6. Each plot is from the perspective of a dif-
ferent VP, and shows all persistent links, ranked by flow density, with target links
highlighted. The arrows point to target links crossed by paths from the VP.
Paths from EU (Frankfurt), EU (Paris), and AU (Sydney) cross only a single tar-
get link in each case, but all cross fairly high-value target links: the fifth, second,
and seventh target links by flow density, respectively. We previously noted that
60% of the flows from the BR (São Paulo) VP crossed target links. However, all of
those flows crossed a single, relatively low value target-link: the 16th. The flow
density of this link is just 31, compared to 957, 319, and 275 of the top three per-
sistent links by flow density. Overall, these results show that (1) even when paths
from VPs in clouds cross target links, they do not cross many of the links in the
set, and (2) the paths do not necessarily cross high-value target links, forcing the
adversary to attack more links, raising attack cost.
We omit charts for the US (Ohio) and IN (Mumbai) VPs, since no paths crossed
target links. However, we note that this result is ideal for a Crossfire defense.
128
129
Figure 4.6: Target links cut by flows from the various VPs, where
|T | = 20. Paths from VPs do not cross many target links, and may
not cross high-value target links.
Cloud paths from Gatekeeper can circumvent rotating sets of target links.
To maintain attack persistence, adversaries can use disjoint sets of target links to
avoid mitigations. Each target link set is chosen independently, after removing all
links chosen in previous sets. We evaluated Gatekeeper paths in this context, and
found that such rolling attack strategies do not provoke higher degradation ratios.
Figure 4.7 again shows the persistent links ranked by flow density, but this
time highlights three sets of 10 target links. For each VP, we note the percentage
of paths that go through each set of target links. Note that paths can go through
more than one target link, which is why the path percentage may not equal the
sum of the fractions of the links. In general, the findings are similar to the 20 target
link case. Attackers can capture a good deal of Gatekeeper paths in some cases
[63% for one set from EU (Paris) and 50% for one set from BR (São Paulo)]. In most
cases, however, zero or few paths contain target links, and overall just 11 out of the
30 target links capture any paths at all. Therefore, rolling attacks do not give the
attacker a significant advantage in terms of degradation ratio.
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Figure 4.7: Target links cut by flows from the various VPs, where
there are three sets of 10 target links. The arrows point to target links
crossed by paths from the VP, and the label indicates the fraction of
paths that cross that link.
Clearly, cloud paths are independent enough from Internet paths that attackers
must flood more links to increase the likelihood of a successful attack, and even if
they do so, there are no guarantees. However, even for the attacks that are success-
ful, Gatekeeper can respond by utilizing a moving target defense.
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4.4.4 Moving Target Defense
A major advantage for Gatekeeper is the ability to leverage the agility and flexibil-
ity of the cloud to deploy new vantage points. While the planning and manage-
ment of deployments at IXPs is more of a long-term process, often consisting of
establishing a physical presence1 and contractual agreements, cloud deployments
can be created quickly. Therefore, we ask: is it feasible to deploy new VPs during
an attack as a mitigating maneuver?
Such a maneuver would be a moving target defense, similar in spirit to several
previous proposals (Geng & Whinston, 2000; Wang et al., 2014; Venkatesan et al.,
2016) which range in complexity from simply changing the victim’s IP address to
shuffling clients that are affected by attacks to intermediate, cloud-based proxies.
Unlike these proposals, Gatekeeper does not use a lookup or authentication server
to map clients to intermediate proxies, but rather utilizes the anycast enabled by
BGP route prefix announcements to map clients to their nearest VP.
The “moving target” in such a scenario is the set of paths that carry traffic from
Gatekeeper VPs to the destination network. The adversary’s goal is to pick a set of
target links that cover as many of these paths as possible. Therefore, if Gatekeeper
had the ability to alter this set of paths, the adversary would be forced to change
their strategy to find a new set of effective links. The effectiveness of the moving
target defense will depend on the ability of Gatekeeper to (1) to maximize the in-
dependence of these paths from those that already exist (and are being saturated)
and (2) alter the set of paths significantly more quickly than the adversary can find
them and attack them.
To evaluate the independence of paths from new VPs, we did a pairwise com-
1Except in the case of remote peering (Chatzis et al., 2013).
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parison of the links on paths from each VP to the destination network. In general,
we found that there is a strong possibility that the cloud paths from new VPs are
quite disjoint from existing paths. The size of the intersection between each VP’s
set of links is shown in the form of a heat map in Figure 4.8. The diagonal of the
heat map represents the number of persistent links in paths from each VP to the
destination network. We find that in our measurement environment, the size of the
intersection of the links between each VP is fairly small. For example, there were
only 11 persistent links in common between (1) all paths from the US VP to the
target area and (2) all paths from a European VP to the target area. This indicates
that the paths from each VP contain largely disjoint sets of links. This is perhaps
an intuitive result for VPs that are geographically far apart, so we also compared
two VPs that are relatively close: EU (Frankfurt) and EU (Paris). We found that
the size of the link set intersection between these two VPs is very small (37 links)
and not significantly different from all other pairs of VPs. This means that it can
be valuable to create new VPs as part of a moving target defense even when they
are geographically close to existing VPs.
Figure 4.8: A heat map showing the size of the intersection between
sets of persistent links on paths from different VPs.
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The second key concern, regarding the agility of the moving target defense, de-
pends on the speed and accuracy of actions from both the defensive system and the
attacker. The defensive system must be able to quickly bootstrap a new vantage
point, but also must be able to propagate BGP prefix announcements sufficiently
quickly to forward traffic to the new VP. In most cases, the convergence time of
BGP update messages is below 5 seconds, although it can take on the order of
minutes in the tail (Tran et al., 2019; Cox, 2019). On the other hand, the adversary
must quickly and accurately find a new set of target links. In Tran et al. (2019),
the authors show that a detour-learning attack can quickly and accurately find new
target links after routing changes affect the topology of the attack surface, but the
technique presented depends on the ability of the adversary to use traceroute. As
shown in Section 4.4.2, Gatekeeper disrupts traceroute and hinders the construc-
tion of the link map due to the tunneling of data plane packets throughout much of
the path to the destination server. Therefore, it is unclear how valuable a moving
target defense using Gatekeeper would be; we leave a more thorough analysis of
defensive techniques and adversary reactions to future work.
In general, Gatekeeper provides several tools and techniques to combat large-
scale link attacks like Crossfire. In the end, the most promising solution may be to
leverage the unique path properties of cloud deployments with the architectural






A recurring theme in the design and implementation of Gatekeeper is deployabil-
ity. At publication time, Gatekeeper is undergoing the initial stages of deployment
by two networks: Digirati and Mail.Ru.
Digirati. A Brazilian Internet company that provides Website hosting and do-
main registration services, Digirati was the initial source of funding for Gatekeeper
and was interested in deploying it for 10 Gbps of protection. The Digirati deploy-
ment drove the development of policies, forming the basis of the network profile-
to-program heuristic described in Section 3.3. It also motivated the development of
Drib (Nathan, 2020), a Rust tool that lets operators manage IPv4 and IPv6 address
for use in configuring Gatekeeper.
Mail.Ru. The second ongoing deployment is by Mail.Ru, a major Internet com-
pany in Russia that owns and manages three large social media networks, and pro-
vides email, search, and e-commerce services. After searching for available open
source solutions for DDoS mitigation, Mail.Ru settled on Gatekeeper as a compo-
nent in their overall defense architecture, and is currently working on a 1 Tbps
deployment.
5.2 CLOSING REMARKS
From time to time, issues arise that challenge the Internet architecture. The Inter-
net is constantly growing in scale and scope, including the emergence of new user
bases [e.g., Africa (Tuerk, 2020)], devices (e.g., IoT), infrastructure and hardware
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capabilities [e.g., 5G, SmartNICs (Firestone et al., 2018)], and applications and ser-
vices [e.g., telesurgery (Gupta et al., 2019)].
These developments push, pull, and poke the architecture in new ways, and
force us to consider how, for example, we can better program networks [e.g., ANTS
(Wetherall et al., 1998)], manage networks [e.g., SDN (Casado et al., 2007)], and
evolve networks [e.g., XIA (Han et al., 2012)]. Along the same lines, the increas-
ing financial, political, and social importance of the Internet has driven malicious
actors to seize on DDoS attacks as a disruptive tool, and so the networking com-
munity has also been forced to reconcile the architecture with techniques to protect
networks.
However, there is a major difficulty in creating solutions that tackle these high-
level problems in the Internet: the architecture itself is famously resistant to change
and intricately anchored to certain principles and protocols. For example, the dis-
tributed administration of the Internet makes it exceptionally difficult to reach con-
sensus among the Internet’s myriad stakeholders. Without consensus, change can-
not happen. Additionally, the architecture’s reliance on IP as the de-facto network
layer protocol makes it prohibitively expensive to remove that dependency all the
way down to the infrastructure level. The number of solutions that have broached
these challenges and failed are too numerous to count. But to be fair, a select few
have succeeded in achieving the escape velocity needed to see actual deployment
(e.g., SDN).
Indeed, there is a tension between architectural “purity” and deployability (An-
derson et al., 2005). Purists argue against the mechanisms that massage the archi-
tecture into being amenable to the deployment of new solutions, such as overlays,
middleboxes, and virtual networks. And there is a convincing argument for this
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view: the architecture is the most stationary aspect of the Internet. Everything else
– the users, the devices, the applications – changes, and does so fairly rapidly, but
the architecture stays the same. Therefore, solutions that are not inherently tied
to the architecture (architectural “barnacles” (Anderson et al., 2005)) risk weigh-
ing it down as trends change. Is the temporary relief worth the added long-term
complexity?
This is the tension that DDoS mitigation solutions from the literature have
found themselves in for the past 20 years. To approach this challenge, we de-
signed Gatekeeper to fit within the Internet ecosystem and architecture as much
as possible. We do not propose new hardware, modifications to servers or clients,
new wire protocols, or shared mechanisms between networks. Instead, we pro-
pose addressing the architectural aspects of DDoS using well-known techniques
and readily-available infrastructure, and doing so while providing flexibility and
performance, as well as aligning incentives, to achieve full deployability.
Central to this approach is the choice of vantage points, which help Gatekeeper
cut to the heart of some of the architectural issues and drive deployment. Their
distributed nature helps Gatekeeper combat the asymmetry of defending a single
network against Internet-scale attacks, and provides topological insight that can
help neutralize source address spoofing. Their proximity to source networks helps
Gatekeeper enforce a connection-oriented network layer with network capabilities,
while minimizing the amount of wasted resources. And the fact that they are well-
provisioned is a natural fit for the DDoS mitigation use case, and lowers financial
barriers to deployment.
We think that this approach is timely. Amid the rising magnitude, frequency,
and sophistication of attacks, there exists a real possibility of large-scale link at-
138
tacks such as Crossfire becoming commonplace in the near future. Since Cross-
fire takes particular advantage of the architectural shortcomings, such as using
legitimate-looking traffic and positioning the attack locus outside of the victim net-
work’s control, an approach is needed that neutralizes the architectural issues at
play. By removing the need for a collaborative defense between networks and
introducing path diversity to scramble an attacker’s attempts at funneling traf-
fic through congested links, Gatekeeper shows promise for combating these next-
generation attacks as no other solution has; moreover, it does so deployably.
So, is Gatekeeper a barnacle? We suppose that depends on what the reader
considers to be inside or outside of the architecture. Are IXPs and clouds extra-
architectural? Does a connection-oriented network layer infringe on the openness
property of the Internet? Do programs in the network core violate the end-to-end
principle? We do not claim to have the exact answers to these questions, but we do
feel comfortable foregoing architectural purity as necessary to mitigate the dam-
age that DDoS attackers have been dealing to the Internet with impunity. We are
also confident that leaving networks undefended and forced to pay for protective
services was not an intended aspect of the architecture. So although Gatekeeper
may or may not fit within the architecture as it was strictly intended, it certainly co-
exists with the architecture as it is. For us – and for the networks that have chosen
to deploy Gatekeeper – that is enough.
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